Much has been written recently about the current state of affairs in Cyprus and the conjunction of the two leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Nikos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci respectively, who seem committed to finally breaking the status quo of division in favor of some sort of power-sharing arrangement. This would end Nicosia's dubious status as the only remaining divided capital in Europe. In fact, in their most recent messages, both Anastasiades and Akinci still express their faith that 2016 will be the breakthrough year that will end the forty-two-year anomaly of division.
The question is whether there is room for optimism, or are we witnessing more of the same; i.e., hopes that will be eventually dashed? Why this gridlock? The quick answer is that the two communities have to balance their relations with those of the island's three guarantor powers – Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom. Any solution would have to account for, or at least get the consent of these three countries that have different interests at stake.
Yet, ultimately, much depends on the two sides, the skills of their leaders and their negotiating teams. In this context, what are the key issues at play?
The first is reaching an agreement on the issue of property compensations; i.e., the total cost figures that have been bandied around have been speculative at best ranging from 19 billion euro to 35 billion euro. The real figure could be close to 5 billion euro, subject to a cost estimate by the World Bank, which has been charged to account for real property values. It would also be subject to negotiations which will account for the appropriate mix of restitution, exchange and compensation as well as for private and public financing of the deal. The problem with inflated numbers is that they work in favor of those opposed to a solution.
The second is the context and role of the hydrocarbons in the eventual solution. There is growing evidence that the Cypriot sea bed is rich in hydrocarbons that could potentially contribute to the financing of the solution but which also necessitate that the region's countries including Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt in particular work together to ensure that their Exclusive Economic Zones are clearly defined and that both the exploitation and transit of the hydrocarbons are to the benefit of all parties. For Cyprus, the options are two: making use of technology and investing in a floating Liquified Natural Gas (FLNG) plant or building a pipeline to Turkey and its energy-hungry market, especially in the wake of Ankara's deteriorating relations with Moscow at a time when Russia provides over 60 percent of Turkey's gas imports. This allows the hydrocarbon factor to play a significant role in the negotiations as the pipeline to Turkey option is potentially a deal maker.
The third factor is the overall geopolitical situation where a success story in the Eastern Mediterranean given its proximity to the instability of the Middle East would go a long way in showing that differences can be bridged and that a Muslim community (however secular the Turkish Cypriots might be) can share power with a non-Muslim one in a governance model that accounts for the many other minorities in Cyprus such as Armenians and Maronites.
The fourth is Ankara's role, which to date has been quite constructive, to the point that it has declared its lifting of visa restrictions on Greek Cypriots and could under certain conditions substantially limit the size of its military presence in Cyprus. This has followed the move by the Republic of Cyprus to demand that Turkish become an official language of the EU as its constitution states that Cyprus has two official languages – Greek and Turkish. After all, Cyprus does not seem to hold the same relevance and symbolism to the current Turkish governing elites as it may have had for its Kemalist elites including the military government.
Finally, one should also account for the shaping of Greek and Turkish Cypriot public opinion which will be the ultimate arbiters of a solution as it will be called to decide the country's future by referendum. The number of Cypriots engaged in bicommunal activities has grown by leaps and bounds ever since the first border crossing allowing for free passage between south and north was opened in 2003. Though this is not necessarily a majoritarian trend, it may be enough to tilt the balance in favor of a unified Cyprus on the strength of the commitment and good faith between Anastasiades and Akinci. While the naysayers on both sides arm themselves with their discourse of mistrust and preference of the status quo, and by extension, the anomaly of division, they need to be challenged at the core of their argument. A failure to resolve the Cyprus conundrum under current conditions with the current committed leadership implies an end to a bizonal and bicommunal Federal Cyprus as well as a unitary country. This in turn would mean that the status quo cannot be maintained and greater uncertainty would become the norm. It is thus in everyone's interest that a united Cyprus emerges soon.
By - Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
