The battle to pry Mosul out of the control of the Daesh organization has not yet ended. But the war for the spoils in its aftermath has already begun.
This was made clear by Mesut Barzani, president of Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and leader of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), in his speech to peshmerga commanders during a frontline visit to Kurdish forces advancing on Mosul last week.
He made two striking revelations.
First, that he candidly discussed the independence of the Kurdistan region with Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi when he last visited Baghdad two months ago, and that Abadi stressed the need for understanding, good-neighborly relations and avoidance of conflict between the two sides. From this, Barzani concluded that it might be possible to reach a “solution” with Baghdad, and if not, the “solution” would be to hold a referendum on Kurdish independence.
Secondly, Barzani said the U.S. had agreed that the peshmerga would not withdraw from “Kurdistani areas” they liberate during their advance on Mosul. He said that 11,500 peshmerga had been killed or injured in the campaign, and “after all these sacrifices”, it would not be possible to return these territories to central government control. “We will retain all these liberated areas,” he affirmed.
What can be concluded from this is that Barzani hopes, on the basis of an understanding with Americans, to declare the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan once Daesh has been overcome in Mosul -- and to annex all the territory that has been or will be captured by the peshmerga to the new independent state, in addition to Kirkuk and Jabal Sinjar.
Barzani has never concealed his separatist ambitions. He has always indicated he wants to secede from Iraq and establish an independent Kurdish state if and when circumstances allow. Like his late father, Mulla Musatafa, he has always known that the main obstacle to achieving that aim is the existence of a strong Iraqi state. That is why he eagerly signed up to the U.S. plan to invade and occupy the country in 2003, overthrow its regime and dismantle its central government and security forces. This was an essential first step to creating the conditions – a dysfunctional and conflict-ridden Iraqi state – to enable the achievement of his goal.
Barzani is a seasoned politician. He took care to avoid specifying which “Kurdistani areas” outside the three Kurdistan Region governorates the Americans – and not the Iraqi government – had agreed to allow him to keep, and to incorporate later into the hoped-for Kurdish state. He left this open because the war on Mosul is still underway and his forces are continuing to make progress. But he clearly implied that the borders of this state would be defined by the extent of the territorial advances made by the peshmerga.
This means that there is a very big chance that the war against Daesh in Mosul will result in another war, perhaps even fiercer and bloodier. Barzani did not deny this in his speech, warning his commanders, “We do not know what the next calamity will be after Daesh. We have to remain fully prepared to confront further threats.”
If Barzani does “not know” what the next “calamity” will be, we can offer him clarification: it is the sparking of a civil war between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, or rather between the Iraqi government and the KRG. Such a conflict would risk dragging in other countries like Turkey, Syria and Iran, and could well prompt the Iraqi Arabs -- Sunni and Shia -- to join forces in a united front against this new expansionist brand of Kurdish nationalism.
From the moment Barzani committed his forces to cooperating with the Americans against Daesh, it was clear that had been assured of a big reward from Washington: a green light to annex Kirkuk and Jabal Sinjar and declare Kurdish independence. Why else would he sacrifice the lives and blood of his troops, and court the enmity of his Arab neighbors along with the Iranians and Turks?
Shared hostility to Daesh in Mosul achieved a miracle. It enabled the creation of a military alliance of adversaries joined together in a single coalition – Kurds, Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Turks, Iranians and others, all under overall U.S. military command. This coalition may last long enough to wage a similar battle for al-Raqqa, Daesh's capital in Syria. But it is certain it will eventually fall apart, as the allies revert to being adversaries, fighting over the spoils of victory – or rather, their shares of the flesh of Iraq and Syria -- with U.S. and European encouragement.
The Americans are talking a lot these days about the historic mistake that was made in the 1920s, when the Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne and the promise of a Kurdish state in parts of present-day Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey was withdrawn. They are now endeavoring with their European allies to correct that error. When President Erdoğan, infuriated by the U.S.-assisted advance of Syrian Kurdish forces in northern Syria in October, challenged them to choose between Turkey and the Kurds, they effectively chose the Kurds.
The reign of Daesh in Mosul, al-Raqqa and other parts of Iraq and Syria has lasted for around three years. The war to end its control is unlikely -- given the number of countries and the size and fire-power of the forces involved – to take longer than one year. But once the mission is accomplished, the conflict that could follow, if allowed to ignite, can be expected to continue for much longer.
Barzani's remarks are worth scrutinizing and analyzing. They offer us a glimpse of things to come in the region: future plans and wars aimed at dismembering its existing states. Who knows, the time could yet come when some in the region -- each for their own reasons -- look back with nostalgia to the days of the Daesh “Caliphate”. Not because they have any admiration for it, but because they are terrified of what may follow.
