The State’s responsibilities during the crisis…

There are new developments concerning the reconciliation process and the Kobane tensions.

Based on the statement made after a delegation from the HDP (People’s Democratic Party) met with Öcalan, the expectations are that the reconciliation process will adopt a new shape and gather speed as of Oct. 15.

It is clear that at the very least this statement will reduce to a minimum the aftershocks resulting from the Kobane incidents, and will provide a boost to the process.

On the other hand, it also looks like the decision by the government to allow the Peshmerga to cross into Kobane, thereby clearly stating its policy of assisting Kobane, will also provide an opportunity for the partial easing of this bottleneck. (Without doubt the first proviso to this is Kobane not falling and the second is Turkey declaring its stance against ISIL in the ISIL-PYD [Democratic Union Party] fight.)

The point we have arrived at can be defined as one where both sides have learned lessons from the crisis we experienced.

Let us summarize. What was experienced?

From the angle of the Kurdish political movement it was this:

Once the risk emerged that Kobane might fall and the Rojava model placed on shaky ground, it began to pressure Turkey into providing assistance; even more so it made an attempt to transfer responsibility onto the AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) by claiming it supported ISIL; and then finally as a means of increasing pressure and overcoming being cornered and attaining a result it decided to “once again make use of violence as a political tool” i.e. the Oct.6-7 incidents.

From the angle of the State it was this:

Ignoring the risk and danger that Rojava posed to the reconciliation process; taking lightly the possibility and strength of the PKK in transferring that problem to Turkey; ignoring the sensitivities of Kurdish public opinion-Qandil-Öcalan with regard to Kobane and Rojava. In addition to this, its statements placing ISIL and the PKK in the same boat, its confrontational attitude, and the Oct. 6-7 incidents…

The organization [PKK] probably realized the danger of going back to the past with its “playing of the violence card,” which would result in soldiers and other factors like Turkish Hizbullah entering the fray in areas it holds sway and its fragmentation.

The State realized the risks of coming face-to-face with the populace on the streets and what the danger of becoming like Assad means.

To an extent these are the reasons that the wheels were put back in motion…

Now this is the question:

Can we continue from where we left off in the wake of the Oct.6-7 incidents and the reasons behind them i.e. a different understanding of the reconciliation process by the sides involved?

On paper, and partially, the answer is “yes”…

However, it has to be based on the understanding that the road ahead will be a minefield and a bumpy one…

If ISIL takes over Kobane and spreads into Rojava, the reconciliation process will be damaged again.

If ISIL is driven out of Kobane, our path forward will be cleared temporarily.

If Turkey finds a way to construct democratic bridges between the reconciliation process and Rojava, the problem will be solved to a large extent in this aspect.

Yesterday I mentioned these sentences by Prime Minister Davutoğlu during his meeting with the committee of wise men:

“The link between our domestic peace and Rojava is this: Our domestic peace will have a positive impact there, while the bad situation there will have negative impacts here…”

Davutoğlu is right and that is what is happening today.

However, it is necessary to define properly the reasons for this. “Bad situation” is actually the PYD losing ground. That loss of ground will lead to increased pressure via the Kurdish movement to “make Rojava a part of the reconciliation process in Turkey.”

Davutoğlu had also added this remark:

“But we will also not accept the stipulation of making Kobane part of the reconciliation process…”

This is a statement in regard to Turkey’s limits when it comes to its Kurdish policy. It is something that doesn’t sit well with the PKK…

At this point, looking from Turkey’s viewpoint, it wouldn’t be wrong to say:

“The creation of an opportunity for the PKK and the problem to take root and gain political depth outside the national borders and stipulations to a solution will result in a sense of “democratic evaporation” inside Turkey, which will hamper the process.” What will happen then?

For the reconciliation process to continue and to create healthy circumstances, Turkey will either have to change its paradigms (which doesn’t look likely in the near future) or change its approach toward Rojava.

As a consequence of recent developments, two responsibilities that fall upon the ruling political power – the primary responsibility belongs to the Kurdish political movement –are:

1-The gap in policies on Rojava: Not taking democratic measures despite seeing the approach of the storm.

2-Responsibility for the political climate: To reduce the bottleneck to a public order incident, exaggerated use of security-focused language and the contents and timing of the security bill…

This is the latest situation.

I will leave the Kurdish side for tomorrow…



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