There are serious obstacles that need overcoming to clear the path for the reconciliation process at the stage we find ourselves in.

The political climate points to the fact that the process has been frozen.

Government representatives begin their statements by accusing the Kurdish side, cite them as being the reason for the impasse, and state certain preconditions for restarting the process.

The same applies to the Kurdish side. At every opportunity it heavily criticizes the government.

Statements issued from Qandil (the mountain base of the PKK in northern Iraq) still accuse the AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) of cooperating with ISIL, and the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) stresses that the process was broken off because the government failed to fulfill its promises.

These accusations do provide clues toward understanding the “problem” of course.

However, we think these accusations and the political logic involved are not the main issue. The main issue is the situation that paves the path for such rhetoric to emerge from both sides.

This is the situation: This process of dialogue that started with different expectations, intents, and aims for both parties is now at a standstill due to the gap created by these differences.

This is because the road that could be traversed despite this gap has been traveled and the stage has been reached where opposing demands clash and need to be agreed upon. On the other hand, the new regional dynamics, the creation of a common Kurdish area and the reigniting of Kurdish imagination, particularly over Rojava, has altered the dynamics of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and is headed in the direction of spilling across the country’s borders.

So, what kind of path can be chosen after this?

We can speak of four bottlenecks that need to be cleared for the reconciliation process to proceed.

The first bottleneck is the pressure imposed on the reconciliation process by the “Rojava issue.” 

The short-term measure to reduce this pressure, and which is already being carried out, is the protection of Kobane, which has become a symbolic city. This measure seems to be in place for the moment at least, through international mobilization, a specific focus on Rojava in Turkish policies and joint action of the Kurds. But the main factor that will reduce this pressure in the medium term is for the PYD (Democratic Union Party, the Syrian affiliate of the PKK) to cut all ties with the Assad regime and get closer to the Free Syrian Army and for Turkey to be more flexible in its stance regarding the existence of the PYD in response.

It has to be accepted that the “train” is headed in the right direction.

The second bottleneck is the gap between “negotiation (Kurdish expectations) and commendation (the government policy).” This gap needs to be bridged to an extent. The primary responsibility for this falls on the shoulders of the government.

Instead of unilaterally trying to implement the reconciliation process by giving it “democratic booster shots,” it is possible to identify what the individual items for a solution will be and how they will be implemented through decisions reached via interaction with the Kurds.

This interactive method is a step that can be readily implemented and would mean issues like the definition of citizenship and local administrations are tackled through some sort of negotiation with the proviso that all decisions reached will be presented to parliament for approval. Without this it is becoming increasing difficult to proceed.

The third bottleneck is with regard to the space allowed for Abdullah Öcalan to maneuver. It is a supplementary step to that of the issue of negotiations. Turkey is carrying out the reconciliation process mainly on the basis of its dialogue with Öcalan and the agreements reached thereby.

However, Öcalan is not able to exercise control over the entire field. In such a situation, Öcalan should be provided with more opportunities to carry on with the process in order to overcome the divisions within the Kurdish political movement and allow him more control in the process to prevent mishaps.

Such a step will also bring a degree of transparency with it. It will enable public opinion to be an observer and judge.

The fourth bottleneck is a responsibility that falls on the shoulders of the Kurdish side. The Kurdish political movement for a long time now been expressing the wish to hold a dialogue with the state about a format for an autonomous system and has been doing so in recent times.

But that same movement looks like it is also seeking to form the fabric of a parallel state by chasing after the formation of a judicial, public security, deeds registration, financial, and other similar structures in the Kurdish area.

This points to two steps -- one forward and another backward -- that cannot be implemented simultaneously. The Kurds cannot expect this dialogue to deepen without stepping back from the line of legitimacy drawn by the political leadership that has been termed “public order.”

The path that needs to be followed is not about the supervision of this area but its configuration. This configuration will only be possible through an agreement on local administration reform.

None of these bottlenecks are of the kind that cannot be solved…