The tentative situation related with the Resolution Process is continuing.
After the Kobane incidents on October 6 – 8, the dialogue between the government and the Kurdish movement got back on track. The ruptured dialogue has been re-established, and both sides didn’t capitulate regarding their resolution willpower, and didn’t take on any sharp manners that would’ve risked the resolution.
The “public order” request brought forward by the political rulership, as a pre-condition for the negotiations, has found a response from both Öcalan and the KCK, or Kurdistan Communities Union. The Cizre incident, which has a dark background, the challenging statements from Ankara and Qandil, and the public inducement wars didn’t change the outcome.
When observed from a distance, the following could be said:
The Kobane incidents on 6 – 8 October 2014 had become an important milestone for the on going “peace process” in Turkey.
These incidents conduced the revealing of “two mechanisms”.
“The first mechanism” is the deepening of Turkey’s Kurdish issue over the regional dynamics and Turkey having reached a phase, which requires redefining its scale and actors.
There are a couple of reasons for this.
The Kurds being the main resistance and land force against ISIL, the importance given to this by the international coalition, and with a more general statement, the acknowledgment of the Kurds by the world public opinion…Within this frame, the positions of the Kurdish organizations, and especially, PKK, had gained more importance.
The siege on Kobane had affected the look of the Kurdish public opinion on themselves. Following ISIL’s attacks and Kobane turning into a symbol, the common Kurdish field, which had been distributed to different countries in which Kurdish groups reside, had become even more activated within the frame of this need for security.
Within the frame of these factors, the Kurdish basins outside Turkish borders have started to gain a decisive importance in the progress of Turkey’s Kurdish issue and peace process.
Demirtaş’s following words, which he mentioned at the HDP Istanbul Congress during the weekend, are the statement of this frame and psychology:
“The point at which we have arrived is the moment of truth for all in this struggle. A century ago, in our geographical area, these types of design phases were being experienced. Once again, they had designated our faiths without asking us first. However, today we’ll not allow this. If this is the moment, where the tail of the calf will be broken (where the truth will emerge), then this time we’ll be keeping the calf on our side…”
As for the “second mechanism”….
The “negotiations” between the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement, which had been officially declared during Newroz 2013, entering a crisis from the point of the meanings they attributed to these meetings and expectations on the peace process from both sides, is also pointing at the necessity of a new definition related with the Resolution Process at the point arrived today.
In this sense, a couple of matters are becoming evident.
How and under what conditions can Turkey’s Kurdish issue and peace process, which intertwines with the regional dynamics, be conducted as a project within national borders? Turkey has many options, like a guardianship pursuit for the region, Kurdish autonomy at Rojava, interfering in a way that will provide turning the situation and equilibriums for Turkey’s benefit, and by pushing the Kurdish structuring in the region as a separate tissue and thus separating it from the peace process in Turkey. Also, two great opportunities are being mulled over for the Kurdish movement: doing politics by keeping Rojava inside or outside the Resolution Process, and advancing with a single or dual parallel model.
Also, another critical matter is as follows; Turkey and the Kurdish movement have reached the negotiation phase. In other words, both sides will sit at the table; however, what will be the matter laid on the table? Will it be the disarmament or retreat, as persistently underlined by the government officials? Or will it be the Kurdish issue that will extend from the local administrations to the mother tongue language matters, as pointed by Öcalan’s agreement text suggestion, requested by the Kurdish side?
These matters compose the resistance threshold, the point at which we have arrived.
Without a doubt, the water will find a path and flow.
However, in which direction?
Time will tell…