The rescue of 49 hostages from ISIL is not only a talent, but also a political accomplishment.

In this story, politically, there isn’t anything more crucial than the rescue of the citizens from the hands of ISIL and having them returned to Turkey safe and sound.

Also, there is nothing more meaningless than telling fortunes about Turkey’s relations with ISIL, just by looking at the result.

As a matter of fact, within this scope, below are the possibilities which are voiced by referring to sources, which don’t hide the intention to define Turkey close to ISIL in between the lines and some are close to ISIL:

“Turkey might have taken back the hostages in exchange for a swap or might have reached this result by giving the guarantee that they won’t be joining the coalition against ISIL...”

How should we observe this?

Turkey might have performed a swap. If so, then it is an extremely legitimate move, which should be kept hidden, in order to save the lives of our 49 citizens.

It’s possible that maybe Turkey didn’t sign the coalition statement at Jeddah because of the negotiations being carried out with ISIL. If so, then it is an extremely rationalist and legitimate attitude.

As for seeing both assumptions as clues directed at Turkey’s foreign policy is a troubled view.

Turkey’s foreign policy related with the matter has three essentials.

Turkey is the only country that possesses a 1000 km long border in the lands ruled by ISIL. In the case that Turkey becomes a part of the active military attitude, Turkey will be confronting ISIL from the front and will be the first country that will come face to face with the ISIL terror. The demonstration style of this salafi organization might drift Turkey into chaos. The government thinks that straying from this is essential for humane and political reasons.
Turkey is carrying the worry that such an absolute, militarily qualified mobilization might feed the Assad regime, which is one of the main reasons of the problem, arms aids might indirectly reach this regime and the PKK, and thus affect the regional equilibriums.
The Turkish foreign policy thinks that organizations like ISIL are the result of the exclusionist attitude of the West and Gulf Countries against İhvan. In this sense, Turkey thinks that all the absolute military precautions will carry an opposite meaning without lending a hand to moderate actions and without a new political construction light, and thus, doesn’t want to be part of this.

These should be regarded in order to understand Turkey’s foreign policy, rather than “looking for a needle in a haystack”.

(If we are to leave aside the Kurdish obsession of Turkey and its wrong and dangerous policies in this matter, which we will handle in our forthcoming articles) obviously, the first and third clauses of these three matters, don’t seem realistic from the point of regional equilibriums or appropriate to the virtue of politics.

We had written before. Joining the coalition and putting Turkey in danger is not the only way of struggling with ISIL.

Thus, the gates being opened unconditionally to Syrian immigrants by Turkey upon the clashes at Kobane, accepting 50,000 immigrants on the first day, the UN’s statement that this number can reach millions – and despite the ones that don’t want to see this –, must be pointing at a political attitude.

By the way, we need to put emphasis on two points.

While over 1 million people, who ran away from internal conflicts in Syria, were coming to Turkey, international institutions, the USA and the EU had left Turkey on its own. Turkey’s “forming a security zone for the immigrants” suggestions had been declined by the “if we do that, then we will have to defend it” reason; the West had left Syrians alone with their faiths.

Meanwhile, radicals are filling the chaos environment, a jihadist organization is being born in this field, and the organization is shedding blood in the region. It is clear that, with the USA being in the first place, the ones, who are defending the Sisi coup, making a connection between İhvan and AK Party, and are busy talking about Islam-democracy contrast, are not moving an inch.

As the violence had been directed to the USA civilians, and as the threat had been felt by the USA, we had experienced how the things had changed.

Now the USA, without changing its policies that partially has a contribution to the production of violence, wants to hit ISIL and invites Turkey to this game.

Some people are evaluating Turkey’s resistance against this danger as Sunnism and being intimate with ISIL. And those people are encouraging Turkey to jump into the blood.

Even excessiveness has a measure.

Then what can Turkey do?

In another article...