In this country, one of the genetic features of the Turkish political system is the officers’, especially the security officers’, empery, which exceeds the laws, legislation and even execution.
The Gülen-led group’s field expansion within the government, formation of a politics pool, coup attempts, had all been actualized over this genetic field. Yesterday, based on the “subversions” of the Ex-Chief of Intelligence Agency, Altıparmak, I had attempted to portray the picture.
An officer tissue and mentality decides on which idea, action, meeting or attitude is legitimate, taking precaution on these matters, especially at the intelligence level, like developing a policy, and, that directs the judiciary (time to time acting like administering)…
The Gülen-led group or another one can only find the opportunity to use force, structuring and expansion if such a system or field exists.
What is expected from the conflict between the political rulership and Gülen-led group is to be conducive towards revealing the danger created by this gap, as much as the Gülen-led group danger. Thus, the necessity exists of drying the main field, which enables such “situations”. So that it would be understood that drawing a line against a tradition, which receives its energy from “the relation of loyalty-authority usage-mentality (or belonging)”, by the hands of judiciary is a basic democracy matter.
However, things are not advancing in that direction.
On the contrary, the political party in power’s fight against the Gülen-led group is carrying the elements of that genetic feature, and feeding that field.
Thus, the fight against the Gülen-led group, more than restructuring the government field (ranging from judiciary to bureaucracy) according to the merit principal, is leaning on the liquidation policy according to the loyalty principle, and recreating that existing system.
Isn’t it that the fight against the Gülen-led group is based on the liquidation of officers, which are not trusted, and assigning the officers, which would be elected with the loyalty principal? Isn’t it that, as the rules of the constitutional state are being stretched with an informative arbitrariness and some legal regulations directed at liquidations are being turned into a toll, that the field in question will be expanding? While one loyalty system is breaking down, another one is being established.
As long as the “rule, principle and merit” trio doesn’t replace the “consciousness, admiration and loyalty” trio, or at least, as long as these principles are not set as targets in the re-structuring of the government field, it would be inevitable for Turkey to keep on reliving some issues.
The issue is not only related with the developments around the Gülen-led group. At the same time, the security officer, who had lost his “judiciary supervision – executive authority balance”, is confronting us in the existence of some steps.
Domestic Security Law is setting a clear example of this with some of its aspects.
It’s obvious that the new and wider authorities given to security forces and administrative chiefs would be reducing the deficient judiciary supervision even more. When these authorities (right or wrong, necessary or unnecessary), our existing political culture and security government tradition is taken into consideration, the doors are being half-way opened for the “officer” to use these authorities with a political and mentality appreciation.
Then, the essential matter behind the danger pointed out by the daily rulership fights for the Gülen-led group’s legal order:
In democracies, the structures, which hold the political power, security power and judiciary power, should be subject to the rules and supervision of the law. In the process of the system, no urgent case in the fight against the Gülen-led group or Kurdish issue will remove these principles, and no tradition can show those principles.
No precaution can exceed the borders of legitimacy and legality. Also, no urgency precaution will no way carry the marks of the extraordinary judiciary signs and continuity.
Note: I would like to make a correction. In my article yesterday, I’ve used Mehmet Baransu’s name instead of Emre Uslu.
