The debates over a presidential system did not suddenly spring up with the emergence of the AK Parti (Justice and Development party) and Tayyip Erdoğan.

It is well known that the conservative segment has strongly backed a presidential system all along, also during the tenures of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel.

In a way it is the same thing being expressed differently when Özal’s wish for an individual-centered system and Demirel’s desire for a presidency capable of dissolving parliament and Erdoğan’s model of concentrated power are taken into consideration.

The same applies when it comes to implementation.

Özal’s Akbulut model which bypassed some institutions (as indicated by the security policies he enacted with ret. Gen. Kemal Yamak) and effectively made Çankaya an institution with regard to certain issues is not very different in essence from the implementations Erdoğan is being criticized for currently.

There is continuity involved.

It is what lies behind this continuity that is actually important; it is the main element that defines this continuity. It would be proper to define this element as an unrefined understanding of national sovereignty that concretely manifests as objection to any division of state power.

One of the most ardent defenders of this mindset to voice this was Celal Bayar. Bayar’s constitutional views and criticisms during the 1965-1970 period and then later during the 1978-1980 period were based on two main pivots.

The first was a pure national will.

This is what Bayar had to say: “Two views on what makes a state have clashed since the 1950s. Will democracy in Turkey be implemented on the basis of the principle of ‘sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation and the nation will use it’ or will it be managed through local authorities and by adhering to the law. The DP [Democrat Party] backs the first view while the Halk Partisi [Republican People’s Party] backs the latter view.”

The second pivot is that of a strong state.

This pivot was mainly formed within the framework of Bayar’s articles in 1978, which applauded and backed the AP’s (Justice Party) constitutional changes of 1971, and the authoritarian constitutionalist leanings of the center-right in the buildup to the 1980 coup.

There is little doubt that these pivots intersected frequently.

The “pure national will” which is enveloped by a “strong state,” (which I stressed upon yesterday) and the “strong leader” which brings these concepts to life make up a trio that points to a patriarchal mindset in terms of political tradition and forms the roots of Turkey’s conservativeness.

It doesn’t take much effort to see that the AK Parti is currently voicing the same themes in various ways. The domestic security bill and its relationship to a strong state, Erdoğan’s opposition and stance against high courts and autonomous institutions, the expression of a desire for a presidential system that strengthens the center of power and is a system based on a leader are clear to see…

In 1965, Bayar not only found structures like the National Security Institution to be unacceptable in light of the notion of a “pure national will” but the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, Court of Audits, Supreme Court of Appeals and other autonomous institutions like state broadcaster TRT were also deemed unacceptable. Erdoğan’s view on the Central Bank on its own is enough to describe the relationship between conservative politics and autonomy.

If Turkey is faced with a problem or debate today, it goes far beyond simply being a debate linked to Erdoğan or his personal leanings.

The problem lies in conservative politics’ key concept of “national determination.”

National determination sees elections as the sole source of legitimacy as far as the state and administration are concerned, believes in the indivisibility of power, takes issue with the principle of separation of powers, and is a tradition that exhibits a type of majoritarianism. When the idea of indivisibility combined with a patriarchal mindset, it aided the emergence of another tradition by paving the way for an order where a strong leader and party with centralist tendencies prevail.

The problem today is the reemergence of this tradition in unadulterated form.

The unregulated and centralist use of the national will, (what the conservative segment wants and desires] not only prevents the political arena from expanding but at the same time also paves the way for creating hegemony over all other arenas.

It is high time even conservatives dealt with this tradition…

It is clear that a pluralizing social fabric and a majoritarian political understanding destroy each other.

I believe this will be the most significant debate among the AK Parti and conservative circles after the elections.