One of the indicative communal breakings in Turkey, maybe the most prominent, is the one related with the “life style”. The secular identity – religionist identity antagonism, the East – West disintegration, Westernization and indigenousness, this “civilizationism” we are encountering today, are the statements, results and indicators of this breaking. This fault line had always been effective in Turkey, and continues to be that way.

Politics and political manners, attitudes and criticisms are still finding meaning after passing through a strainer in a considerable extent. For example, even the authoritarian arguments are done by correlating with roots and beliefs and by putting emphasis on “mentality”, rather than “administration style”. Today, the arguments centered on foreign policy, the Islamism and Sunnism accusations of the secular segment towards AK Party and the increasing emphasis that AK Party is following an identity policy in domestic politics, are closely related with the activity of this fault line. While the partial communities, which are based on (secular, religionist and other) congregations, like Turkey, possess a political culture that is established on loyalty and benefit instead of merit and principle, it’s a fact that this situation is provoking and deepening this breaking. Also, our political culture is confirming the relationship between “right and benefit” according to the temperament of each segment, and exhilarating this activity even more.

This is an understandable situation only if the sociological and historical data of the country is taken into consideration.

Turkey’s exam with democracy and the road it attempts to follow in the direction of democracy had become a permanent exam condition with these traditions and also stayed within the natural borders set by these traditions.

However, sometimes the “perception of the issue” beats the “issue itself”.

Recently, especially since spring 2013, we have been breathing such air.

Even though the reason changes frequently, and even if the matters like: politics’ tyranny over other fields, environment problems, foreign policy, rulership quarrels, and share quarrels, becomes prominent, and even if frictions like the Gülen issue had occurred, we are in an excessive politicization, which appears like a cultural, qualified, denominational conflict based on “identity polarization”. Like every excessive politicization, this is also a state that exceeds sociological realities.

Thus, today, if you base on this politicization in order to understand and explain Turkey, you will be leaving out the point arrived at and the distance covered in the sense of sociological breakings.

From the point of life style or value system argument and conflict, we need to underline two points especially…

-    Turkey had left behind “secularity arguments indexed on government layout” via the experiences in the past 15 years. Claims like “Religious layout is coming, secularity is going out of reach” had lost their meanings considerably, and in this matter, “relative trust feeling” had replaced matters like “worry, conflict and imposition” in the majority of the community.

The headgear ban being lifted in universities first and in the public sector afterwards, and now in the elementary school, and the perception style of this by the community – in other words these developments being experienced as normalization – is clear data in this matter.

Of course, the “issue” hadn’t been gotten rid of completely. The encounters of different value systems in the public sector, share discussions, and its relationship with the politics mechanism are still ongoing. However, the “issue” had been transported from a macro field to a micro field and from the regime field to the individual field. In a sense, this situation had paved the way for a natural discussion between conservative and secular groups to sprout, and the politics to sit on this platform and become normalized. We are not the only example in this matter. The West is still experiencing colorful political discussions via matters like abortion, homosexuality, the body, alcohol and birth control.

The second point is related with “religion-community-politics”.

If the radical movements, where Islam had become a tool for objection and revolt, are staying away from Turkey in every sense, then don’t we owe this to the political experience we had lived via AK Party, as much as our own traditions?

We are advancing; I wish we were aware of this…