The “Why can’t AK Party, government, Erdoğan state that ISIL as terrorist” sentence is one of the most frequent sentences that has been used in columns, TV and political conversations.
Two days ago, Prime Minister Davutoğlu has reminded us:
“We had declared ISIL as a terrorist organization with the Cabinet Decision on 13 October 2013…”
This is the statement part of this…
There is also a political and perceptual part of it… US Secretary of State Kerry was saying the following things in the program he participated in on MSNBC:
“Turkey had experienced a difficult situation, because of the 49 hostages. Despite this, Turkey had attended the meetings that took place in Jeddah and Paris. Erdoğan personally indicated that Turkey has a stake on clamping down on ISIL. Turkey’s borders and security is under threat.”
Without a doubt, ISIL’s expansion ratio, intensified attacks on Syria, ISIL reaching a 5 – 10 meter distance to the Turkish border, ISIL causing an immigration wave, the uncertainty directed at the near future regarding political equilibriums and ISIL becoming a threat is taking place in between Ankara’s new sensitivities.
Naturally, there is a “contradiction” and “dilemma” between this situation and Turkey keeping a distance from the military coalition because of the justifications we had underlined yesterday.
We should accept that this dilemma and similar dilemmas are playing a role, which has frequently been blocking Turkey’s foreign policy recently.
How can we overcome this dilemma? What will Turkey do? What should Turkey do?
These questions are of importance in a political and humane sense.
There is no doubt that political equilibriums will be reformed in the region every day and Turkey will be forced to take a stand against these.
It wouldn’t be wrong to draw the picture as follows: In order to avoid fighting with ISIL from the front, and to keep the doors, which represents the politics’ virtue in the reformation of the equilibriums at the region, Turkey will not be a side of any military attempts.
On top of that, Turkey will be forced to give it’s all to get rid of the versatile threat, including ISIL’s increasing heaviness and the oppression it creates over the Islamic movements in the region.
Without a doubt, some of Turkey’s risk lines and worries define this binary situation.
The three incidents; “Assad’s legitimateness”, “the PKK turning into a part of the coalition and changing the political equilibriums” and “Immigrant rush”, seems to be the three worries of Turkey within the frame struggle against ISIL.
As a matter of fact, the intensification of the concrete suggestions in the “cushion region and regions” is also originating from these worries as much as the humane reasons. The cushion region seems to be directed at forming a life assurance, stopping the immigrant rush, and, the pursuit of putting a distance to the Assad regime and conflict zones.
It’s known that this proposal cannot come to life without the UN’s decision. As for this type of decision, it is not that easy in the present political equilibriums. Moreover, even if this decision had been taken, this cannot be expected to not have an effect on the military necessity, which is directed at the protection of these cushion regions, and the ISIL-PKK-PYD equation. In other words, it seems that no matter what happens to PKK-PYD, they will become stronger and more valuable, which is something that Turkey is leery of.
In this case, the most realistic and effective option, from Turkey’s viewpoint, is the Kurdish trump card.
With the Peshmerga, PYD and PKK, Kurds are the only factor in the region that can repel ISIL by balancing it.
No matter what Turkey and other countries think, no matter how the ISIL story comes to an end, Kurds will become the essential organized power of those regions in the middle of the 21st Century.
Playing the Kurdish trump card points out seeing this reality, making peace with it and cooperating with them.
It requires to overcome the “Kurdish obsession or worry”, especially in reviewing the PYD relations, and including the Rojawa region and outer Kurds in the resolution process. Turkey’s support for the Kurdish groups, who are trying to protect their lives and fields, with an “indirect support and political close contact” in a way that will leave Turkey out of military attempts, will be deepening the peace process. And especially if the happenings in Kobane are to be taken into consideration, it might make it possible to carry the politics’ virtue to that field, and open a new path over common benefits with the Kurds.
Are these things an intellectual enforcement or far from assumption?
We don’t think so…
On the contrary, this is a new and concrete path that is suitable to Turkey’s desired playmaker role. This is the most suitable model and attitude for democracy. Also, it is a door that will make it possible to make up for some heavy mistakes.
How?
Tomorrow….
