The recent incidents should bear some meaning from the angle of the Kurdish political movement. If we are to look beyond this organization’s strategy carried out against the state, the question “What do the ‘Kobane incidents’ represent for Kurdish politics?” is paramount.

Let us start out with the following fixation. With its KCK, DTK, HDP, YDGH and other structures, the Kurdish political movement has completely settled into the political field in 6 or 7 of Turkey’s important southeastern provinces, and also partially in some other settlement where they are more intensive. Thus, this had provided uniformity at that field. And from their point of view, they are in a monitory position at that field with “indirect sovereignty” and a half-formal “political center”.

Then, how did we arrive to this point?

Of course, there is an apparent natural process, which had formed by itself. The arrival point has a close connection to the direction of the historical flow. There are no doubts, despite the prices paid, that the Kurds’ struggle has an important role in this. Whether we like it or not, this struggle is represented by the organization and Öcalan. As Mehmet Uçum mentioned in the Wisemen Committee meeting held yesterday, “The Kurdish issues has many sides, like the people living in the region; different groups and different tendencies. Though, their addressee is the Kurdish Political Movement…”

However, this struggle and structure are not the only factors. The willpower presented by the political ruling party, and within this frame, the political transformation, which is being supported by the EU process and has been experienced for the past 12 years, has an important role as much as the struggle. In short, despite the crises, like “KCK drills”, which point at the state’s attempt (or the necessity) to monitor the Kurdish political field, the extension of the essential rights and freedoms field is forming the other face on the medallion.

The peace process and “the state of no-conflict” have reinforced this table greatly.

On one hand, the Kurdish organizing had been politically and gravely left alone in this field as an addressee (other than elections); and on the other hand, the meaning given to the Kurdish movement by the Turkish community had deepened this indirect sovereignty also at the perception level.

As for the expectation within this context, if the democratic diagram rules are valid, then of course, it’s to gain “autonomy” in relation to some kind of system and to become its new part, which is the modifying power of the system; thus, the movement is articulating to the system.

Naturally, this expectation had been left hanging in the air during the disconnected periods, and had been partially achieved via politics during dialogue periods. It is clear that the Kurdish political movement had advanced politically to a new founding position following their attitude, their stance as regards to the system and their support to consistency during the Gezi incidents and the December 17 – 25 period. This founding function had also acted as the function of turning their field control into democratic and natural.

Today, we are at the point where the film has been broken.

Following the recent incidents, this structure and the course of events had received a big wound.

We have to approach the “What is the meaning of the incidents from the point of the Kurdish political movement?” question, from this angle – or, to be more accurate – from the assessment of the damage caused to this frame by these incidents.

Following the developments, which are the results of the strategy conducted by them, the Kurdish political movement is face to face with “three critical risks”.

There are also people like Hatip Dicle, who are aware of these risks.

Also, there are people, who on the contrary use the “uprising policy” as a tool.

The responsibility of the state and the government is clear.

However, the responsibility of the organization and the Kurds is also clear…