For the first time, the Resolution Process is facing such a gigantic disengagement risk…
This was the summary of what I've said yesterday.
Such a possibility, not only frays the Kurdish issue, but also deranges the political weather and balances of the country.
Whether liked or disliked, the Resolution Process is the shape of politics and hope that is placed on inertia on the country's most crucial issue.
A possible disengagement experience states a conflict and tension from the mountains to the region, from the coasts to the cities, and from the parliament to the community.
It will disrupt the stability, call back the securing and authoritative weather, and invite civil wars.
Why are we face to face with the risk of disengagement?
My opinion is that there are five separate intertwined reasons for this.
I've mentioned the “first" one yesterday: following the civil war, in which a new field had been opened for the Kurds in Northern Syria and Kurdish movement in Turkey. Southeast of Turkey and Northeast of Syria; those two regions exceeded the limits symbolically and thus, politically entered an indirect addition process. This situation began forming an arbiter factor in the strategy of the Kurdish movement, and from the point of the Kurds it almost formed a pre-condition for the Resolution Process. In exchange for that, the government's “policy to keep the internal and external Kurds away from each other", “identification of the formation of the political Kurdish entity as a red line" and “reducing the resolution to democratic integration" all started forming a complete contrast with this new situation.
Also, the recent developments deepened this contrast enough to break off the relations; PYD reunited two cantons by capturing Tel Abyad; if they capture Jarabulus they will have three cantons united. The summary of the point arrived at: Turkey is regarding this as a preparation to establish a government and an ethnical cleansing, and attempting to interfere in it.
There is a result here.
The result is; in terms of system, the Kurdish issue is tending to form their main axis around “national worry and securing attitude" rather than “Resolution Process and politics".
If the regional balances, including PYD-PKK's status, and the traditional government reflex that is coalescing with AK Party is taken into consideration; there is no indication that this “relocation" is temporary. It's clear that this situation will be forming serious pressure on the Resolution Process and establishing a situation that can give rise to conflicts and crises in Turkey, Iraq and Syria.
The “second factor" is related with the reactional and introverted weather that is blowing in Turkey. This weather is the acceleration gained by the tendency to explain the problems/nuisances/failures and the crises experiences over a conspiracist logic, with an emphasis on an exaggerated senior mind, and designs based on a foreign hand, a foreign enemy, Western crises and Israel.
This has two results. While all the internal issues, especially the Kurdish issue, are being moved outside the argument, criticism, error recovery, correction policy and questioning fields, and thus, with a clearer expression, by being pulled to a “non-political area", they are being reduced to a single-axis and identified as a government issue, and to “technic" and “organization", “interest" and “tactic" duties. On the other hand, especially the opinion that the international forces in the region, for example the U.S., are showing an effort in forming a Kurdish state and designing it; is turning into a main factor that completes the Kurdish issue. While internal and democratic necessities are falling from the principle game; the national interest and necessities of the politics are prevailing.
It's an exceptional case where the second factor intertwines with the first factor. It's also clear that this situation is causing another opposing pressure over the Resolution Process and the perception of the Kurdish issue, and is provoking a new type of polarization. This breeze, which started after the Gezi incidents, had turned into a sharp storm after the elections.
Long words, short space…
Other factors, which leave the Resolution Process face to face with the risk of disengagement, are; “the fraction in Erdoğan's view", “the actors of the process becoming blurry" and “the post-election bonds formed between votes and the Resolution Process by the political parties" and “the new political array".
We will talk about these factors tomorrow…