Whatever the reasons behind the laying of the groundwork and accelerating of processes that led to the Oct. 6-7 incidents, those incidents were the result of the Kurdish political movement’s “strategy to redeploy the use of violence as a political tool.”
What gains did this strategy bring for the Kurdish political movement?
From the perspective of an observer, it brought almost nothing other than to display their determined stance on the topic of Rojava. (It was only a display at that.) Additionally, the introduction of violence was not the only option available for displaying this determination. Without doubt, holding rallies with the participation of millions would have provided better results.
The decision to arbitrate and prevent the fall of Kobane is not the result of this strategy. It is instead closely related to the international coalition and the sensitivity shown by Turkey in regard to its own position and interests.
What about the consequences of such a strategy?
The following sentences are from a news article that was published in yesterday’s papers:
“Fethi Yalçın, a member of HÜDA-PAR in its Bingöl Karlıova branch, was killed yesterday. PKK-HÜDA-PAR clashes erupted during demonstrations and a total of 23 people were killed. The PKK held Turkish Hizbullah responsible for the deaths of four people in Diyarbakır, two in Mardin Dargeçit, and one each in Batman and Kızıltepe. HÜDA-PAR, on the other hand, claimed that the PKK had killed 13 people, seven of which were its members. Turkish Hizbullah in a statement on Oct. 12 stated that it should be known that it will respond in kind to these attacks.”
Two theses exist about these events. One is that the territorial fight between these two groups has flared up. The other one is that some murky powers have reentered the fray. There is a variety of speculation and comments that these murky powers might be counterinsurgency forces or external elements.
The result is the same regardless of whether these incidents are due to the actions of the deep-state, the games played by some intelligence agencies, or whether it is part of the PKK-Turkish Hizbullah fight. The result means that in every sense violence enters the political sphere, and appears to shown signs of the emergence of territorial feuds and the danger of increasing chaos.
Furthermore, if looked at from the viewpoint of the Kurdish political movement, and often stated by me, it prepares the ground for new actors to be brought into play in the space controlled by this movement.
If we consider that the Kurdish political movement, which reached the stage it is at today and the informal role it has gained in the reconciliation process, by expanding and supervising in the political sphere the idea of “violence employed in the founding stages,” it finds itself as a candidate for “losing” to violence this time.
Without doubt the most vital point here is the risk of lasting effects of the involvement of third parties and the lasting damage that might be done to the reconciliation process within this framework.
There is no doubt that the atmosphere generated by incidents like those of Oct. 6-7 created the path to reach the stage we find ourselves at now.
Responsibility belongs to those that adopt the type of reasoning that tries to make such an atmosphere a strategic tool.
This is just one side of the matter…
From last Sunday onward, Yıldıray Oğur from Türkiye newspaper, Hilal Kaplan and Markar Esayan from Yeni Şafak, and İsmet Berkan from Hürriyet have been mentioning in their stories criticisms made by Prime Minister Davutoğlu of the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party), Demirtaş, and the HDP delegation that visited İmralı (the prison island where Abdullah Öcalan is serving a life sentence.)
Yesterday the HDP as a party and the HDP’s delegation to İmralı rebutted these stories. Actually they rebutted the prime minister (who at least 54 people had heard making these comments.)
However, these rebuttals rather than being a reflection of the conversations between the ruling party and the Kurdish movement are clearly an expression of the internal discussions within the movement.
In fact when members of the HDP say that there is no question of them having made promises on behalf of the KCK (Kurdish Communities Union), they are trying to poignantly present a picture that they have contact with the KCK.
What does this mean?
In one paragraph this means:
The Kurdish movement is faced with the possibility of suffocating as a result of its internal politics problem. Another perspective is that violence-free political tools are of vital importance for the Kurdish movement if the Kurdish problem gains an international dimension.
For example take the situation in Kobane. The grounds were prepared for the passage of the Peshmerga to Rojava through the pressure applied on Turkey and the atmosphere generated on the international scene.
This is an act of assistance but it is a step that the Kurdish movement did not want. It did not want it because it wants that sphere to be under its own influence.
To summarize: The Kurdish movement needs to see that it cannot gain ground through impositions.
