The Turkish modernization model, as it’s known, had been fitted on a “Turkish-secular citizen”, whose assignments, rights and attitude have been tightly identified by their life style. As for the attempts in creating the official person, within this official identity frame; that person became the main pillar of the Turkish modernization project. All the identities and requests, which had been left outside this, in other words, the political movements, who underline the autonomy of an individual within a state-individual polarization, had been regarded as “centrifugal powers”.

All the intermediary actors and institutions in the community had been equipped with functions that will materialize this official identity project within this frame.

The center right and center left parties have always officiated as tools that tame centrifugal requests, in other words, the national state model’s synthesis tools, integration tools and filter mechanisms.

Liberals, Socialists, Kurds, Islamists, slum-dwellers and religionists were forced not to transform their identities and requests, which had been refused by government-based modernization, into political identities and requests: in other words, to imprison them to private places, which are being identified and controlled by the government.

It could be said that, the understanding of Turkish “democracy” had been limited to allow freedom to cultural and political differences and values within the frame of private places and private lives.

As for the progress shown by the Turkish democracy; it had been measured, not like the nationalization or the increase of private places, but by the increase in the number of values and differences, which can be stated within the frame of private places and worlds.

As for the political parties; they had become democrats at the same rate they had provided this increase in numbers.

In other words, the conflict between the central power and centrifugal power states the existence of a structuring, where the private lives and local-cultural identities had been imprisoned in private lives and the public life had been designated by the political center. This structuring rests above a duality, which tightly separates the private field and public field. For a long time, the Turkish political life had been shaped by the efforts to realize the demands of the centrifugal powers.  Sometimes this was realized by the tension caused by the central power’s efforts to oppress this, and sometimes directly and sometimes by taming it.

In other words, they had designated a certain rulership relations field and a life-style, and used this as the symbol of protection and even confirmation. Within this frame, secularism in the cultural and social field, the monopoly-type of industry structuring in the economic field and a closed income system, become evident as the principal dynamic of the Turkish system and globalization. Likewise, the globalization policies in Turkey had stated, instead of emphasizing democracy, liberalism, which is being identified under protective borders. The existence of a closed rant system, like a meta, had redounded a counterintuitive context, which is based on consumption.

Because, while finding statements, refusing rivalry, freedom and equality, even though it’s done indirectly, and defending financial integration with the West under certain conditions within the duality structure, it is closing its doors to political liberalization.

Had this model gone bankrupt, or is it still being maintained with different “centrifugal powers” and/or essential tissues?

Will the new constitution be a cure for this?