We are in the last days of 2014. The principal development to have an impact this year – at the same level as Tayyip Erdoğan’s being elected president – without doubt, was the fight conducted against the political wing of the Fethullah Gülen community.

Many of the debates in the political sphere were focused on this fight and the clash that lay behind it. The fight against a fabric that didn’t hesitate to use the judicial and security forces to further the interests of its own group was multifaceted. The fight against a fabric which had infiltrated the state, supervised more than half of the ranking officers in the police force (provincial police chiefs being the exception), and was claimed to have more than 5,000 members in the judiciary which it ordered to act in concert.

From the very first day we have been using the expression “twin authoritarianism” to point out these facets. The community’s fabric, actions, aims, and moves that were hidden behind some correct steps, really politicized the Turkish judicial system, polluted it and immobilized it.

The use of judicial and security forces for its own interests paved the way for acts of usurpation, rights violations, arbitrary arrests and convictions. The result was a clear “state of authoritarianism” that affected a large area, ranging from the demilitarization process to the Kurdish issue.

This fabric, which hid behind notions of judicial independence, state officialdom, and corruption-related dossiers, was the cause for the taking of a series of measures that were occasionally incompatible with democracy such as the HSYK (Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges) law, internet restrictions, and the potential YÖK (Higher Education Board) law.

There is no doubt that the situation that resulted from such a picture also created a “state of authoritarianism.” Political debate in the country during 2014 was shaped on the basis of this clash and these states of authoritarianism.

Polarization generally resulted on the basis of the authoritarian pressure applied to one side and to one problem.

The change made to the HSYK enabled the Justice Ministry to intervene in that institution and thereby counter the effectiveness of the community. The opposition took up the issue on the basis that the executive branch was interfering in the judiciary. However, on the other hand, in its current state, the judiciary was falling under the control of a cell outside the bounds of the state; and in this aspect, the rule of law was being trampled underfoot.

They preferred not to view the issue from that aspect. Leaving aside the allergy the liberal left segment has toward the AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) on the one hand, and its reactions to the AK Parti’s patriarchal style of conducting politics which is based on its own identity on the other hand, it even steadily established an open alliance with the community.

In response to this, the other pole began implementing a stance geared toward its defense, which was an amalgamation of its view that the fight against the community was vital and obligatory; its concession that the government did not respect the legal rules and autonomous ideas; and some of its boorish language and positions.

Just like it was with the other side, extraordinary measures began to be confused with extraordinary law somehow. The instrumentalization occasionally reached such a point that it appeared to be similar to what the community had been engaged in at one time. For instance, a statement by Ogün Samast, the hit-man who killed Hrant Dink, that “the community planned the murder” was deemed creditable and started being circulated.

Let’s draw a conclusion now…

If you lean toward viewing the relationship between the political leadership and the community as a power struggle, it is clear that the former is legitimate while the latter represents an illegitimate power, given its intentions and presence within the state apparatus.

If you view the community issue as a problem independent from a power struggle, you will again reach the same conclusion. You are faced with an illegitimate situation, which is fatal for democracy, and requires urgent preventative measures.

Regardless of whether one is close to the political leadership or not, the picture won’t change. Differentiating between the legitimate and illegitimate on this topic does not mean having to approve of all the policies and stance of the government…

To put it bluntly: the inability to differentiate between the legitimate and illegitimate, not caring about it, succumbing to the attraction and rage of fighting the leadership and therefore cozying up to it, or even taking up a position under its wings, is not a comprehensible situation.

For it to be this difficult for the opposition segment to say “the AK Parti is a problem for us, and so is the community issue” can only be explained by basing it on the mindset, and in the case of some (not everybody needs to take offense!) the existence of a post-Kemalist backdrop.

Let’s come to the other side of the coin…

It does not suffice to just say these things, and keeping out of the issue does not, on its own, represent the correct choice.

The legitimacy of the fight by the elected political leadership, and the organ responsible for the functioning of the state, against the illegitimate does not mean that all the methods it uses in this fight are legitimate and correct.

The political leadership, in this respect, and in respect of the democratic situation, has four weaknesses; hence four requirements…

What are they?

Let’s leave that for tomorrow…