The pain in Soma continues increasingly and as a matter of fact debates become politicized. It is top priority that the responsible must be found in terms of conscience, ethics and politics.

However, we must avoid the pain from getting instrumentalized. Our eyes and mind are fixated on Soma, and yet our topic in this article is different.

There is no limit to the "crisis analysis" regarding the near future or the implications on its "end" or the "authoritarianism debates".

Is that really so? Or what kind of a near future awaits Turkey? Those who claim that the era of Erdogan through a corruption reading overlooked the Gezi incidents and December 17 strike found themselves in a big misconception.

The result of the elections in March and the debate over the election of the presidency point the opposite direction:

Turkey will take its walk with Erdogan and AKP for a longer period.

The question that must be asked is :

In what way? In what field and what direction?

Let me first clarify this remark: AKP is about to enter its third phase. In the initial two phases, political and social changes were realized with their outlines and chief pillars of the ex-regime were destroyed. The third phase is the stage for establishing the new regime and the change will likely take place in the constitutional regime at every intuitional level and order.

The starting point is clear: That the president will be voted by the public and the "political or non political candidate" period is leaving its place to "leader-candidates" indicates that Turkey will begin to gradually depart from the parliamentary regime. This is a sign of a semi-presidential or a process towards the presidential system and the main topic that Turkey will focus on in the next term is how this transition will take place.

Let us take a short cut and say that it is certain that Erdogan will rise to Çankaya.

And there will be only a year duration left for general elections in 2015.

Within this period of time, it is quite likely that Erdogan by laying out all his personality, power, and opportunities with an implication or pressure "either presidency or crisis" will turn the 2015 elections into a referendum of presidential system and run after the constitutional majority in order to change the constitution.

It is also quite likely that he can go beyond the 330 limit that will launch the referendum. Considering the current political and social balances as a data, this will open the way to the presidential system.

And probably the "president" Erdogan will consider is to run the presidency in Turkey until 2024 after being voted for two terms.

The dominant party, the charismatic leader and three sellouts.

There seems to be no political and social power that could stop this process other than a huge economic calamity or turning upside down in the conjecture or a complete failure in the Kurdish question.

The CHP is still preoccupied with the ideal president debate and internal issues, while MHP is focusing on a "reactionary vote". Both of them don"t have any strategy for the near or middle term.

In this possible strategy the essential problem of AKP is that there is a whole year interval between the 2014 presidential election and the possible referendum.

Within this time period, it"s crucial what kind of method and policy Erdogan will implement. The real issue that may be expected is whether Erdogan will show a stance that is compatible with the constitutional regulations at Çankaya.

If the reverse occurs and Erdogan will choose to become the prime minister, apparently, Turkey will find itself in a series of breaches in the constitutional law. And that will open the door to a new system crisis. The system crisis means inter-institutional chaos and tension. What opens the door is either instability or force. In such case, there is no doubt that Turkey would fail in terms of democracy and be stuck in difficulty on the international arena and become exposable to unsettling attacks. On the other hand, if Erdogan will develop a strong and directive presidential model and if he won"t exceed the constitutional limits his path will be relatively clearer.

Another critical issue is the peace process. It is problematic for two aspects: "the transitional process" is too long for the Kurdish question. Besides that, the government will need the Kurdish support for its own strategy. Therefore, we can say that the Kurdish question will have a role in determining his strategy and the new political era. The gradual continuation policy of the opening process and the new role that HDP will take on and the redefinition of expectations and dates are strong possibilities. Of course turning a new page in politics is not just about going straightforward to the presidential system.

How come?

Tomorrow.