The political agenda has become enmeshed in important foreign policy issues.

The ISIL issue, Turkey’s place in the coalition, Rojava, the attack on Kobane, and the PKK’s position in that region are developments that are not just limited to foreign policy.

Every single one of these issues reflects on internal policies and will continue to do so…

It looks like Turkey’s Middle East policy is based on four elements:

1-The quest to see the establishment of democratic institutions in Sunni countries that have emerged, or are trying to emerge, from dictatorship based on the wave of change symbolized by the Arab Spring…

2-The support for movements like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, who within the framework of the Arab Spring can be termed as moderate, and seek to attain power through elections and seem to have the potential to be pluralist in the future…

3-The quest to expand the space for righteous policies in places like Palestine and Gaza that are faced with heart-breaking violence…

4-The quest to balance the Sunni-Shia balance in response to the Iran-centered policy of a Shia corridor from Iraq to Lebanon, which poses a risk to, and has disrupted that balance in the upper Middle East…

Turkey has been implementing this policy for quite a while now.

However, this policy can provide different results during different periods depending on external factors, perceptions and who stands to benefit from it.

Interestingly, both the perception that Turkey is “a model country that brings together Islam and democracy” and the claim that it is no longer a model country came to the forefront within the framework of these above-mentioned elements.

The change in regional conditions and balances, and Turkey’s efforts to adapt its main policy to these changes and the active stance it took within this framework (for example Ankara’s opposition to the military coup in Egypt) moved Turkey’s image in the West from one end of the spectrum to the other.

In the initial stage of the Arab Spring, when mass demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt brought down dictatorships and similar regimes in countries such as Jordan, Syria and Yemen were faced with a similar threat, Turkey was considered as deserving of “great respect.” This was due to the stance Turkey had adopted and due to the foundational models it was proposing to these countries. (Excluding the Israel and Gaza matter.)

During the second phase of the Arab Spring, groups with links to the military gathered in Tahrir Square to protest against Muslim Brotherhood rule and Turkey vociferously opposed this “return to the past” and took a stance against the West, which supported a coup.

The eruption of the Gezi events during that same period and the tensions that grew during those days led to police violence. The claims that the Erdoğan government was becoming authoritarian, coupled with the search for parallels between Tahrir and Taksim opened the door for a new image of Turkey to develop.

What had changed?

Turkey’s foreign policy stance and who its allies were hadn’t changed.

Internal political balances had not changed either.

Of course the Gezi events were poorly handled, just like such incidents often are in many countries across Europe. The language of violence used and the police violence was disproportionate, but again just like it occasionally happens in many Western countries as well.

The AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) used strong language and even adopted a challenging tone. The tone, however, was no different from the tone that it has always adopted, even during times that it had been applauded. As far as freedom of the press was concerned it was the same as it had always been.

The regional balances were what had changed…

The fundamental issue was that the West, which had supported change up to that point, now supported reverting back to the old order and fell out with the AK Parti because it opposed this reversal of stance. These jarring waves followed one after the other.

Erdoğan’s opposition to the West and the re-emergence of the negative views about Turkey that it is anti-Semitic were not because it changed its image, but rather a result of its image being changed.

Of course changes occurred in Turkey such as the tensions between the state and society, the blockage of some channels of communications between politics and society, the emergence of a climate of crisis and disruption of public order, the political leadership adopting a tougher line and the rise of the opposition. But none of these on its own could be sufficient for this change in Turkey’s image.

The summary of the story is:

Turkey’s agenda is not based on a single aspect and is not just about the ISIL issue. It has been, in fact, for quite some time now, primarily based on foreign policy as a whole…