When the arguments incline towards two separate, extreme ends through the attitudes, it hurts the Turkish democracy with all its aspects, rather than benefiting it.

The recent arguments around the Constitution Court appear the same way.

Let us first start with the first side…

While the Court’s rule-making tendencies, which enter the legislative field (aside from the some spot on, positive decisions like the internet ban and the Balyoz case),  and associating the court’s function with supervising the implementations of the political rulership and execution, are all forming a “clear problem”. In the periods, where the name of the opposition is not even mentioned and where a dominant party model reigns, the political supervision function of the high court inevitably gains momentum.

However, this is an unacceptable state of submission from the point of democracy. Because of this, the lawyers and judges are keeping their eyes open against this possibility, and this takes part in the requirements of a state of law.

In this sense, the hot agenda is as you know it. The Constitutional Court will be discussing the individual applications of the two political parties, which is about the 10 percent election threshold and asking for its cancellation.

As far as it’s understood from the statements of the president of the court, if the wind doesn’t blow from the opposite direction, if the departments, which will discuss this individual application, make the decision of violation, then this time they will be submitting their cancellation application regarding the relative legislation to the trial chamber.

Before the 2015 elections, the doors of a political chaos and legitimacy crisis will be opened.

Then, does the Constitutional Court have such authority?

While there is no judgement that gives such an authority to the Constitutional Court, also in the 2010 alterations no such authority had been given.

Even further…

Let’s us read an info note from the Ministry of Justice;

“In the 49th clause of the Draft Law no. 6216, a judgement as follows was envisaged: ‘(6) During the evaluation of the individual application, if the departments reach the conclusion that the violation of the fundamental right is based on the law or KHK’s (Public Services Commission) judgement, then they can appeal to the trial chamber with the demand of cancellation.’ However, this judgment had been discussed in the Constitutional Committee, and due to following justifications of the sub-committee:

this judgment is taken out of the draft by common consent….”

Now, the question is this; why are the winds from the Constitutional Court blowing in the opposite direction?

The answer is as follows: Politicization, entering the political field through the notions like comment, ruling case, judicatory activism and by compelling the legitimate borders of these notions….

There is also the medallion's other side.

As for this side, there is a mentality which; reacts against the judiciary supervision by using this function as an opportunity and hiding behind this function, observes the division of powers mistrusting, and sees the institutions like the Constitutional Court as useless and a leftover of coup with the pluralistic usage of the national will notion.

This mentality is being frequently mentioned by the political rulership, and it is being passionately defended by the people who are located in the rulership ranks.

We are not in the 1950s…

The existence of judicial, executive, supervisory, autonomous and neutral institutions against politics, is one of the indispensables of today’s modern democracy.

The tyranny of politics is as problematic as other tyrannies.