We had experienced the heavy crisis of the internal conflicts of the Resolution Process through acts of violence that turned Turkey upside down. In my recent article, I had said the following:
“The authority void in Syria had provided a platform for the PKK to implement its desired autonomy formula at Rojava and make an inveterate move politically outside Turkey. This situation was completely contrary to Turkey’s democratic vaporization policies (which could be identified as a complete integration via rights) towards the Kurdish issue. Because of this, the Rojava factor had become a new element and issue from the moment it appeared. Turkey’s policies towards breaking the autonomy and PKK-PYD’s cooperation with Assad, had been regarded as correspondent moves. And all this had burst via Kobane…”
Of course, the “responsibilities” related with the incidents, and the questions “Who attacked who?” “For what?” “What was the objective” and “What kind of result had been achieved?” are all important.
The present discussion in Turkey had been conducted mostly through these questions. Criticizing the government’s provocative, dismissive language that is unsuitable to the peace process, seeing PKK’s threatening and violent game, which they are attempting in order to dictate Rojava, taking an attitude against it, are also vital in the sense of political stance and warning, as well as political definition and democracy necessities.
However, the limit and balance of this is important.
Because, this type of situation can unavoidably push sides to take sharp positions, to talk within these positions and to be imprisoned within a certain critical attitude.
This states that these discussions will be carrying the conflict in the streets to the minds, as much as acting as the criticism and warning. Piling the responsibilities to a single side and absolutizing them might pave the way to adding fuel to the flames instead of calming the incidents.
While thousands of people were dying and being killed in Turkey between 1978 and 1980, the fair-unfair, guilty-innocent discussions had formed the outer circle of the struggles. Today, when we take a look back, what’s left is nothing more than the smell of violence.
The “responsibility discussion” shouldn’t be disregarding the fact that there is a multi-sided responsibility table apparent. We had said: We are experiencing the “conflict” of Turkey’s policies to keep the Rojava topic outside the resolution process and PKK’s policies to turn Rojava into a criteria of the resolution process via the ways they now.
The responsibility belongs to all the political actors, who regard this conflict as politics and don’t prevent this conflict even though they see it or cannot make out it effects. Without a doubt, with its language and actions, PKK will be in the lead. The government will be following it with its language and political deficiencies.
The incidents had calmed down at this stage. Because PKK had retreated and pulled back its youth. As for the government, it had opened the doors for dialogue and shown the importance of it. The demands on the Kobane matter had lessened a bit, and the rate of giving had increased.
What about from now on?
We should not give away to despair no matter what.
The solution for these types of rooted issues will not advance via a straight line.
The recent developments are a serious prediction that caused the organization and state to see their own limits.
The organization must have seen the risk of sharing the field, which they keep under supervision, with forces like Hezbollah and the military, and bringing the military back to the game, via this type of attempting policies.
As for the government, they must have seen the risk of facing with the public. While 70% of the public had gone down to the streets in some provinces in southeastern Turkey, the state authorities must have seen their power’s limits.
Now, it’s time to take positions again and re-establish the balance.
The essential responsibility lies here, and it always will be.
