Intellectual terrorists, internal operation elements and the ‘national axis’

Intellectual terrorism, mental terrorism is a danger that does not get much focus in Turkey. It does not hold much place in the category of internal and external security threats either. It is not included in the country, nation or state’s definitions of danger.

Threats are generally identified in many categories such as terror, foreign intervention, resource problems, internal structures aimed at weakening the state’s domain of power and global-scale crisis waves.

These threats, their definitions constantly change. They change according to Turkey’s change, the power showdowns throughout the world. Guard is taken against other countries, powers’ public opinion operations inside Turkey, their mass mobilization projects and political and social transformation projects.

Yet, generally, if such projects are being carried out “on the inside,” silence is maintained. It is either not taken notice of or its criticality is not grasped well enough. In such cases, the country, the people and the state are obliged to face an internal threat. In such cases, projects controlled from the outside are served internally, adorned in innocent demands and brought forward as an objection from Turkey.

Turkey is one of the countries most susceptible to such operations. Such operations have continued from the late Ottoman period until all throughout the Republican era and in time, has started to threaten the country’s integrity, the people’s unity and all the differences in the country have, through this, been turned into areas of conflict. This method has been the most successful among the West’s tutelage tools and it has always worked.

In recent years, the increasingly strengthening “local and national” sensitivity has given the opportunity to strengthen the awareness, stance and state of alarm of internal security problems, terror threats from surrounding countries targeting Turkey, the Atlantic Alliance’s plans to siege our country and multinational interventions like the July 15 attack. The July 15 shock has shown that the targets of foreign intervention have changed and that the identity of internal threats has no significance at all.

Turkey has drawn a new path for itself, started to gain prominence with its own power rather than the protection of its allies and formed a new “patriotism” line within a vast scope spanning politics and defense power. The Euphrates Shield operation is the product of such a concept. The Afrin operation is the product of such a concept. Our fight against the terror corridor in Afrin that entirely surrounds our southern border is against both terrorism and multinational intervention plans.

If we remember, in each such action, our country was stopped internally. Whenever Turkey turns toward the outside, there would be major tremors on the inside, ranging from terrorism to political crises, to identity fights. Those were moments when those controlling the game from the outside activated “intellectual terrorists, unarmed forces.” These groups would take action and strike the country internally based on what the U.S., EU, Germany, the U.K. or France says.

Fancy statements, intellectual pride, giving orders to politics and the community, splendid lifestyles, mocking this country, belittling the nation and their values, promoting the discourse for Western invasion projects under the “anti-war” epitaph, protecting terrorist organizations in the name of “peace,” and most importantly, poisoning the masses’ minds are some of their qualities.

They are secret enemies of Turkey. Whenever they are needed, they immediately take action. They protect even the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the name of enmity toward the country. They are constantly talking about democracy and freedom, but freedom is solely for those who are anti-Turkey. Because they hate this nation.

They are the ones who published notices as soon as the Afrin operation started. Intellectual terrorists are the unarmed soldiers of the Western invasion and terrorist organizations. This is how they planned the Ayn al Arab (Kobani) incidents. As the Fetullah Terrorist Organization’s (FETÖ) and the PKK’s Syrian affiliate Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) cryptos, they wanted to do the same thing against the homeland defense that started in Afrin. But Turkey has learned to fight against the enemies on the inside as it fights the forces on the outside. When clashing with the PKK in Afrin, it has learned to fight against the native unarmed cadres of terror. The end has come for their plans to siege Turkey with terrorism as well as their internal operation plans.

This is what the “national axis” is like.

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