Turkish and Iranian Foreign Affairs have been working for some time on the infrastructure of President Ebrahim Raisi’s Türkye visit. There will be both technical and political meetings. The peak was Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian's meeting in Ankara with Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

Meetings between the two countries are taking place under exclusive regional and global circumstances. Hence, many have their eyes on Türkiye’s relations with Iran. (“US chief of staff's visit to PKK terror group in Northern Syria,” Mar. 8, 2023.)

As known, Türkiye does not support unilateral sanctions on other countries, primarily those imposed by the U.S., Russia, and Iran are examples of this. This additionally signifies opposition to American policies. As Ankara’s justifications are valid, and because the current world conjuncture is not convenient, Washington is unable to say “much.” However, it is unhappy!

Iran, the only mechanism still standing in Syria among the Astana Trio, is joining the “normalization process between Türkiye and Syria.” Meanwhile, “Astana+” seems to be a new platform, in which the formal conditions are being determined for the time being. We will observe its nature and outcomes associated with its functionality over time. But we now have such a platform. The first meeting will be held next week in Moscow.

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There were other platforms noted during Minister Abdollahian's Ankara visit. These were added beside the Astana+ by those eyes.

One is the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Iran triangle. We can write without going into detail that it is against the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Israel triangle in terms of Tehran.

The second is the “3+3” table (consists of Türkiye, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia), which is the significance we shared first in this column. It was mentioned openly by Iran in the meeting.

Imagine the map: The first is that this is a South Caucasus format. The second is a border! Your sense that these countries form a barrier. But it is in a sense! When, how, and into what it will evolve depends on time. However, those who established and accepted the idea to build this barrier are doing this “against something.”

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This area sets foot on every strategic output provided by the Ukraine war – sometimes to crush it, sometimes to find balance. Furthermore, this area holds all the political and strategic doors provided by the Middle East – sometimes to prevent the door from closing, sometimes to stop it from opening.

Naturally, it is “critical” for the U.S., the U.K., Israel, and a series of countries whose strategic degrees are dropping gradually. It is obvious that they will attack, they have no other chance. There is the east of the barrier as well. It is critical for them too.

Tying it all back to Iran, the Iranian foreign minister ended his statement by saying, “President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s visit was very important. Iranian President Raisi’s Türkiye visit will be the commencement date of new relations.”

Of course, a note of caution: Every interaction does not mean we are bound to each other. We will see how it works, and what it will lead to. But this is the current picture. Some want it to be this way, while others don’t. Our “eyes” will follow what side they take.

What does Ankara think about 'Nordstream sabotage’?

Let us first remember the “Very important” seal. The sabotage targeting the “Nordstream Pipelines” connecting Russian gas to Europe was carried out to eliminate all likelihood of relations/alliance between Russia and Europe.

If you noticed, nobody claimed since it was first heard that it was an “accident.” The opinion is that the sabotage was conducted by the U.S. European countries that failed to point the finger at Washington. In fact, some even wrote reports trying to clear them. But everyone knew the U.S. was the one that pulled the trigger.

The New York Times wrote in its March 7 report based on U.S. intelligence that the sabotage was conducted “off the records” by a proxy force affiliated with the Ukrainian government or its security services.

Of course, this caused chaos.

Seymour Hersh, a prominent U.S. journalist had published in early February an article alleging that the September 26, 2022 sabotage on the Nordstream I and II pipelines was conducted by the U.S. He openly associated the U.S. administration with the sabotage, and exposed the president along with a series of officials by name.

Hersh later added, “It will have major political effects for us. President Biden and his men in the White House continue to deny it. Who knows why The New York Times no longer reports on this matter. It repeats what the government says. We will see its political effects in the long term. In fact, some countries will leave NATO. It is more important for Biden to continue a war he is destined to lose.”

This is The New York Times’ – or rather its “sources’” – response. We understand from this that the Nordstrom pipeline sabotage rapidly evolved into being a part of American domestic policy and the presidential elections.

The first point we need to note in NYT’s report is its “favoritism” of the Kyiv administration. As a matter of fact, we may even witness a “disorderly” group or the “proxies of a force within the government annoyed by Kyiv” inference.

We must also keep in mind Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s dismissal recently first of the “Joint Command Centre,” which has been directing the army since the start of the war, then the defense minister, and, last week, top intelligence officials, in terms of a likely connection!

There is an international dimension to the matter as well. China and Russia on Feb. 22 called on the United Nations to investigate the sabotage claim. “Many countries are expressing suspicions that the event was caused by the conscious actions of some state actors. It is becoming increasingly clear that it was no accident. Those responsible for this must be found.”

In brief, the issue is growing bigger. I am most curious about what Ankara thinks about this matter.