It may not be as popular as the “one minute” event, but some moments from the European Political Community (EPC) that gathered Thursday in Prague will be the subject of further discussions.
One of these is a Greek journalist’s question to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, asking, “by saying, ‘we might come suddenly one night,’ are you saying you might attack Greece,” which he answered as, “you understood it,” and added, “[this statement] is not for you alone,” referring to Syria, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), its armed wing in Syria, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) - whomever/whatever threatens Türkiye in this sense.
This outburst has a response in domestic policy as well. Considering the fact that an inaptitude planning to attack Erdogan through the “headscarf” happened only 24 hours ago, without thinking about the response, embedded in the Turkish public’s mind the suspicion about “which opposition leader could give this response to the Greek journalist’s question, and protect national security and independence.”
Do you know why? Because whether President Erdogan’s responses are liked or not, Ankara told all groups attacking Türkiye in Greece’s person, “I am not afraid of those behind you or the U.S.” We cannot see anyone among the opposition leaders to say this to the U.S., especially ahead of the elections. But there is a lot of discourse to the contrary: they are the ones that will “normalize” with the U.S.
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Back to the EPC and knocking on the numerous doors it opened.
Even they themselves don’t know exactly what the EPC is. When you bring together 27 EU countries, plus 17 countries linked to the region – that is a total of 44 countries – you have to say something. If you look at Paris, this is their “search for a strategic convergence plan”!
If you print a different “Europe” calling card by including non-EU member countries such as Türkiye, the U.K., Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and some Baltic countries, you will be asked one, “what is your location?’ and two, “what is your aim?”
Let us first understand Türkiye’s participation. Ankara joined the EPC on the condition that it will not harm its more than half-a-century legal acquis and candidacy goal with the EU, but the truth is that the EU is not a priority for Turkish foreign policy. In fact, it is not even in the top five currently. It is fine to add an annotation in the name of protecting the “gains,” but that is all. You can see those who will associate this statement with the love of the EU and the EU objective from a different perspective. But it is reasonable, appropriate, and timely in terms of Ankara.
The geopolitical tectonics of such a mass is no small matter. Regardless of how you evaluate it, the reality will point you to, “What does the U.S. say about this?”
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The Ukraine war and Europe’s nightmares such as economic realities, the energy crisis, fractures in the supply chain, the rise of fascist movements, heavy pressures from the U.S., et cetera, constitute all the tearing aimed at the EU’s vital integrity. This then strengthens the pursuits for a more independent, a more autonomous Europe – in fact, concerning security matters as well – in European countries like France and Germany. Their desire to recover relations with Russia at once and get on with it is clear. We can consider this as their struggle to get escape a mangle. It is a dramatic picture. You can look at it with pity. After all, it is the story of the U.S. murdering the current Europe in order to shape “Europe as it desires.”
The second view is whether the EPC is a pursuit or an inquiry towards this aim. There are many who defend this theory. Yet, there are also those who claim the EPC is a U.S. project, and that it is a U.S. attempt at “renewing its own Europe.” In other words, weakening the resistance against the U.S. through Europe’s expansion by means of creating new geopolitics.
There are many variations. Looking at the EPC map, you can see a Europe trying to resurrect with a new role in world politics, as well as the weakened Europe. We will learn soon which one is right.
However, the first outcome of these developments is that the EU is now experiencing “multiple organ failure.” It is either going to die or expand by resisting the U.S., suffering great losses, or losing its bodily integrity. It is acromegaly. The second outcome is the existence of an effective anti-American mindset.
The third output, which is most important in terms of Türkiye is based on a simple question.
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Which one is most suitable for our gains?
Essentially, the current ambiguity is in Türkiye’s interests – especially in terms of foreign policy interests. Surely this will not be forever. Economic and strategic conditions may reach stability when anti-Türkiye activity and policies diminish.
A map of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural River” seems impossible without Türkiye. The EPC is drawing up such a map, and whether the EU and/or the U.S. is in this, does not change the result in the macro assessment. It is not without faults. It can facilitate U.S. entry into the Caucasus, the Caspian, and Eurasia, but those areas have already been fortifying in the last few years anyway.
What remains is the Russia-U.S. war specific to Ukraine. The meeting this week in Istanbul between Turkish Presidential Spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin and U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and the meeting Friday between President Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin was an inquiry into whether Türkiye could develop intermediation between the two superpowers. This is the highest level in diplomacy.
Additionally, U.S. President Joe Biden’s statement, “Russia’s nuclear threat is a major risk, and we are trying to understand Putin’s way out of war,” strengthens the assumption that the U.S. will not respond when Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. is also recently seeking a “way out” of Ukraine.
We are going through a time period in which supply is currently central in Türkiye. Let us see what happens.
