The Kremlin, which used the harshest language/threats of diplomatic show of power from “waging war" to using nuclear weapons, openly showing Ankara the energy/natural gas card – amid all this madness – has a reasonable justification. Not necessary. This is such a sensitive case for Turkey that it does not need to be opened again. Turkey started collecting gas from the world before it heard the statement, “I will cut the gas," and there are many who are willing to give gas.
The latest in the energy issue is more worth following now. Hearing from Iran of the “gas cut" expected from Russia necessitates following the matter. Tehran's cutting 50 percent of gas to Turkey saying, “Winter conditions have become harsh, so our internal consumption has increased," is of course a “crossfire," but the next day it was also heard that this situation had improved. (“Iran gazı kest" (Iran cut the gas), December 9, 2015, Habertürk.)
It probably cannot be said that the following statement, which arrived at the same time, is coincidental, but are they coordinated? First, Israel President Benjamin Netanyahu said: “We discussed gas sales with Turkey. The gas fields in the Mediterranean will connect the moderates in the region. Natural will provide a stronger ground to Israel against international pressure." Israel Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said: “We are considering all route operations, including Jordan, Greece, Turkey and Western European countries." (Hürriyet, December 9, 2015.)
Secondly, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's statement, “Ties with Israel may be bettered/fixed. Why not," on Israel's Kol Yisrael radio during the climate conference in Paris, which was “a quick response to a question that was broadcasted as it suited their purpose," but which could at least be included in the chronology.
Thirdly, can we include the new name of Israel's secret service MOSSAD, within this context? The following are among the reasons the new administrator (Yossi Cohen) came to post: “Activating secret connections with countries whose relationships are tense, and increasing Israel's capacity in international partnerships, and the necessity of secret ties in international exchange of intelligence. The second reason Israel wants to develop its secret diplomatic ties through Mossad, is shown as the diplomatic isolation of Israel." (Yeni Şafak, December 9, 2015.)
The day after these news stories were read, the following developments took place: “A formula for Israel natural gas: 'Special company' agreement," “Israel deadlock can be solved be Turkey," “Israeli gas for TANAP." Of these, we should separately consider the mention of Israel particularly in TANAP. We remember what Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said during his recent Baku visit in the presence of President Ilham Aliyev, don't we? “We agreed on the completion of the TANAP Project before 2018. We are going to work night and day. The TANAP Project will also affect the balances in Europe." (We mentioned above that there are many countries willing to provide gas to Turkey. Qatar, Azerbaijan, Israel, Northern Iraq and Turkmenistan were the first ones. Why?) Lastly, the final acts: “Turkey was invited to the Athens summit organized by Greece, south Cyprus and Egypt. Leaders at the summit said: 'We want other neightbor countries to join the partnership among the three Mediterranean countries.' " (“Üçlü zirveden Türkiye'ye davet" (Turkey invited to trio's summit), Sabah, December 10, 2015.) Let's think together whether there is coordination or an equal/common/superior mind but now, let's get back to the Israel issue…
The state of Ankara-Tel Aviv ties is no secret, especially after the “one minute" incident and Mavi Marmara. Israel's approach is in the direction that the conditions required to re-establish diplomatic ties have been met. For Ankara, it is not yet “complete." If there are any mediators, they should keep this in mind. It is important that it was said “complete it" rather than “it is incomplete." The Palestine issue is still Ankara's prerogative.
Yet it is true that the tension between Israel and Turkey has alleviated or been alleviated. Israel was not attacked as much during the June 7 and November 1 elections – with the effect of the different conjuncture.
The most remembered of the secret contacts between the two countries, is the one between Israel's Director-General for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dore Golf and Turkey's Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioğlu in Rome. This does not mean much anymore either, because the contacts between the two countries in this aspect were never cut. We know this. Now, the possible development is the relationship to be established between Israel's secret service and its new chief and Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT). (Allow me to make a guess: This might come true in February-March 2016.) But… It needs to be shown that the ugly and calculated attitude toward the MIT Underscretary is also “over."
The two secret services already have an intelligence connection through future regional developments with Syria and Desh. It doesn't matter whether this is more or less. There is no such thing as secret services not being on speaking terms.
As for “obligatory and rational path" suggestions for Turkey and Israel… There is nobody breaking their neck for this in Ankara. If you push hard, you can hear, “There are many topics lately requiring overtime in Turkey's European Union affairs. We recommend the same to Israel."
I personally am determined to wonder the results of the 2016 US elections, because the Israeli prime ministers words regarding Donald Trump are telling.
