If we were to gather the television discussion programs and newspapers, everything written and said about Idlib to date will most likely form a corpus. But if you ask what the “strategic summary” is...
You are either given a boring chronology starting from 2011, over and over again, or a “pixelization sanctification” that preaches how micro-particles will impact the big map.
Things that are far from reality.
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We must evaluate the real weight of the U.S./Western body that hangs over the Astana alliance through Idlib. As Astana’s objective is quite clear, it can be identified as “temporary” and this is its weakness.
Additionally, the noteworthy concerns of the three partners Turkey, Russia and Iran regarding each other are always available to be brought to the fore. Iran is afraid of rapport between the U.S. and Russia. Turkey is afraid of rapport between the U.S. and Russia. Russia is afraid of rapport between the U.S. and Turkey, which is the easiest of all options.
Do you think Iran did not notice that Russian President Vladimir Putin did not even mention the U.S. at the Tehran summit?
Yet, none of these weaknesses and fears were able to overcome/corrode the Astana wall that was tested countless times since January 2017.
If you look carefully, peace in Syria is likely to be reached with close regions where this model can be applied and to new partners.
But first, Idlib must be handled.
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Russia’s attacks on the Idlib periphery needs to be made sense of. Attacks are what support Turkey’s plans to solve the Idlib issue and remind actors of the time limits. Based on this, we can say that Moscow is going to give a chance to those in Idlib seeking to cut a deal.
Turkey implied in Tehran that if its interests in Idlib are forced, it may leave the Astana format. The moment Russia saw this, it must have remembered the “strategic alliance” items.
Therefore, based on the principle that “Russia cares about nobody but itself,” it is going to wait for Turkey to fulfill its promises in Idlib.
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One of those promises was that it would “establish bases” to stop the complaints of a superpower like Russia regarding attacks from mostly plane-like model drones. Russia, which held the most spectacular military drill ever seen – Vostok-2018 – could not even say “we will protect ourselves” in a live broadcast.
We should interpret it as meaningful that Western countries with which our relations are sour, and not the Astana partners, support President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ceasefire call.
To say this is “Love again with the West,” is to insult Ankara’s mind. This support is poisonous. But the West taking this attitude is “useful” for Ankara.
Turkey is directing these West cards to its Astana partners and gaining time in Idlib. For example, that was Erdoğan’s message in his “The World Must Stop Assad” article he wrote for the Wall Street Journal. It was published in the U.S. and read in Russia.
We are also using the other side of our hand. The official discourse that Manbij is being neglected emerging now is to push around the U.S.
In an interview U.S. Secretary of Defense Spokesperson Eric Pahon gave to Turkish newspapers, his statement, “The Turks are not going to come into Manbij for the foreseeable future,” is proof that Washington really is going through a special period of confusion. If the Pentagon sees adequate the excuse, “it is taking time to install the radios,” as to why the cooperation in Manbij is not progressing, everybody needs to be concerned about who is in charge of the nuclear weapons.
This U.S. is giving Turkey the message to “go” in Idlib. Though those with hope that Turkey-West relations will improve show this message as proof, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) should put these items at the top of those that need to go.
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According to the U.S.’s official statements at the United Nations General Assembly, Astana has collapsed and Turkey saw the truth after its offer for a ceasefire was rejected.
We would believe this if Nikki Haley, who promised to stand by as an unequivocal ally of Israel and said she wears heals to kick those who bring anti-Israel offers to the UN, was not the one who said it. Turkey aside, Russia and Iran are well aware of how useful Astana is.
We had written after the Tehran summit that Turkey had not closed the Idlib case. What Erdoğan said during the return flight should have been interpreted in this sense.
In addition to the preliminary contacts between the Germany-France-Turkey-Russia delegations on Friday, the Kremlin announcing that the Erdoğan-Putin meeting will take place in Sochi on Sept. 17 – only 10 days after the Tehran summit – is a sign that we are in a different stage.
We can say that the notion of Turkey and Russia taking control of the area takes precedence over the Damascus administration’s move aimed at Idlib.
The way the “design” and “mechanism” of what is to be done in Idlib operates seem to be set.
This is important!
Lavrov: “The Astana trio cannot do what the U.S. did in Raqqa. The 12 observation points established by Turkey alleviate the situation.”
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Lastly, the answer to unknown complicators saying, “How is Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) going to be disarmed, they will attack Turkey, all the organizations in the area united,” an argument repeated constantly, may be “weapons.”
The ties of the terror organizations in the region to Idlib is presented as a factor that makes it difficult to disarm and/or neutralize them. It is the opposite. Hence, they will disintegrate…
