Turkey took major leaps in 2020. These leaps were taken particularly along the axis spanning Libya and the Caucasus, and concerned the country's own destiny as a risk of war was potent. Though Turkey was a physical party in both these wars, it was never officially involved in the conflict. Turkey's physical presence in both these countries was enough to show that it ran the risk of eventually going to war. This was also an indication that Turkey was ready to pay a price to protect its interests in the East Mediterranean. This determined attitude is proof that Turkey's struggle for survival is so much more than just talk, despite the risks posed by the coronavirus pandemic. However, what is more surprising is that the internal repercussions of these events are stronger than their projections abroad.

While European countries and the U.S. were helplessly suffering in the early days of the pandemic, Turkey refused to give in to the disease. Turkey's health system did not collapse during the pandemic; on the contrary, it showed that it is capable of taking action much more swiftly than developed countries. Concepts such as “developed, developing and underdeveloped,” which were quite common in the 20th century, discreetly lost their popularity in recent years. The helplessness of Western countries in the face of the pandemic was an indication that the change lies much deeper. This thus explains the severity of the internal reflections of Turkey's fight overseas. Mutual relations of dependence, which were a result of the colonial ages, led to the emergence of certain dependent structures. These organizations have been driven to war against Turkey since 2013.Particularly during the pandemic, dependent organizations in question were more overt regarding their actions against Turkey.

We now require new concepts to understand the developments post-2013. Not only do the existing concepts fail to define the process, they also cast a heavy veil of mystery over reality. The more Turkey repels the incursions of imperial centers, the more these dependent organizations will start to disintegrate. Yet it was Turkey and its close region that were expected to disintegrate. The fact that Turkey and Egypt encountered simultaneous incursions reveals the extent of the regional disintegration targeted. The events taking place in Iraq, Syria, and Libya were signaling that a regional disintegration had begun, but it was nipped in the bud in Turkey. As a result, dependent organizations could not avoid dissolution. The more moves made by imperial centers in efforts to stop Turkey, the more dependent organizations started mushrooming. They started losing strength against Turkey.

We must admit that concepts such as conservative, religious, left-wing, right-wing, secular, and pro-West are no longer defining. New alliances are not established upon old differences. We even witnessed an opposition leader attempting to form legitimacy with reference to Turkey's post-modern coup on Feb.28. This was meaningless, yet nonetheless an important outburst that explains the process. That post-modern coup had caused superficial problems, and thus laid a suitable foundation for the interventions of imperial centers. Turkey did not have the power back then to respond to imperialist interventions. This can help us grasp the great losses Turkey incurred during the 1990s. We were doomed to a fight between the blind and dialogue between the deaf. Though the imperialist pressure, which had paved the way for Feb. 28, had been overcome, the opposition leader standing with teary eyes, relying on the old days of Feb. 28, shows the depth of the legitimacy crisis. Reconverting Hagia Sophia into a mosque bears symbolic value. We previously mentioned that concepts such as conservative, religious, left-wing, right-wing, secular, and pro-West are now far from being defining. The natural gas discovery in the Black Sea, opening Hagia Sophia to worship as a mosque, the fight for survival in the East Mediterranean, the refusal to surrender Libya to putschist Khalifa Haftar, and Azerbaijan’s 40-day war in Karabakh no longer allow these concepts to be identifiers. The news of these events were received in a vast plane, from the Caucasus to the Balkans and the depths of Africa, with joyous demonstrations. However, some traditional conservative organizations remained quiet. This must therefore be evaluated within the scope of these dependent organizations’ disintegration. It is obvious that they are going through a major legitimacy crisis.

Turkey has clear goals, which are a beacon of hope for the future. Hence, in order to reach these clearly expressed goals, Turkey requires new institutions, new ideas and concepts. As these continue to emerge, dependent organizations will also continue to disintegrate.