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Sevres syndrome: Siege

Old accounts are not easily closed. The emotions known as Sevres syndrome are not so gratuitous, although they can sometimes be exaggerated, even to the level of paranoia. Although the imperialist ambitions in our geography have transformed over time, they have not completely disappeared. When we entered the First General War, we had already lost most of the Balkans. When the war was over, the Arab region was added to it. In the maximalist dimensions of the plan, it was to present a state in Anatolia to the Armenians and Kurds. But this did not happen for various reasons.

The foreign policy of the newly built Republic regime was structured with an approach devoted to peace in both the west and east directions. It goes without saying that this is extremely rational. But they pierced it over time. Neither Sâdabat nor the Balkan Pact could last long. The good relations established with the Soviet Union disappeared at the end of the Second General War. Türkiye's foreign policy re-entered the control of the West through the situation into which it was inevitably pushed. In the late 1950s, Greece and Türkiye were once again made hostile by a subtle British game. In the Arab world, the BAAS ideology kept the enmity of Türkiye alive. The Armenians, who lost their presence in Anatolia, were stuck in a small piece of land in the Caucasus as a Soviet. What they could do was to belittle and humiliate Türkiye in the world through the vengeful ASALA terror and, more importantly, the diaspora. Kurdish nationalism, on the other hand, has been escalated especially since the 1980s. We cannot say that the Turkish political classes have given a very successful test in the face of these repressions. Many times, wrong policies have been produced that magnified these threats. The narrow-minded practices of September 12 and the 1990s magnified the problems, let alone fixed them. But this is the other thing… The developments that we have given a rough summary about reveal enough that Sevres is not simply paranoia. This is a case. Let's look at today.

Today we are closer than ever to a Turkish-Greek war. One spark might be enough. There is no need to explain the situation in Syria and Iraq through the events from the 1990s to the present. The Gulf Arabs (Saudis and UAE) and Egypt are not stretching as much as desired, although Türkiye takes steps to soften. More importantly, the new Arab nationalism rising in the anti-Türkiye wave is in intense cooperation with Greece and Southern Cyprus. Moreover, these ties operate under the patronage of the U.S., EU and Israel. Solidarity between Greece and Armenia is also added to this. Finally, China has settled in this context. The tension between Turkish and Chinese diplomats at the UN a few days ago is proof of this.

These reminders should not be understood as photocopying the present over the past. Yes, the scenario is the same. But the historical context is different. Türkiye, which was gradually pushed out of the West, is no longer the Türkiye of the 20th century. Yes, our economic and commercial dependence on the West still continues. It's impossible to break up all at once. This is our weak point. But we can make more autonomous decisions politically, and we can resist when appropriate. More importantly, other unexpected developments have consequences that may increase Türkiye's resilience capacity. Along with Türkiye, there is another giant power that is the subject of exclusion in Eurasia: Russia. The direct and indirect consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war are surprisingly transforming Türkiye-Russia relations. The aim of the West from the very beginning was to make these two ancient states hostile to each other. Türkiye's blind moves during the Arab Spring served this purpose. In the Mediterranean, the two states were positioned in opposite camps. Let's be more clear: It was Türkiye that made a mistake in Syria. Russia made a mistake in Libya. But in time, both sides sobered up and realized the game being played. He was able to develop a dialogue between them without provocations. One of the gifts of this was their cold-blooded collusion in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war in the Caucasus. The smart policies followed by Türkiye in the Russia-Ukraine war relieved Russia. Developments are pushing Türkiye and Russia to make a common destiny. Losing Nord Stream, Russia wants to turn Türkiye into a new energy base by including the Caspian.

The policy carried out by the Atlantic Bloc with the emergency code is aimed at ending Turkish-Russian cooperation. 2023 seems to be very critical in this respect. Two regions were chosen for this: the Balkans and the Caucasus. In the Balkans, the rope is in the hands of Russia. If they dare to burn the Balkans, they will obviously lose Türkiye altogether. God willing they will not do that. In the Caucasus, Armenia gradually began to show signs that it would break away from Russia. Russia is forced to choose between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If they miscalculate here and misstep, they will find Türkiye against them. Let's watch how all of that will unfold in the coming days…

#Türkiye
#Sevres
#Russia
#West
#Atlantic Bloc
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