The election on November 1 is rapidly drawing closer. Somewhere I wrote that this election was an election to “restore trust” for the AK Party which lost trust.

The AK Party has been the leader and carrier of the very important steps overcoming the historical deadlocks of Turkey during its rulership period.

It is not wrong to interpret the loss of the trust and support that the party experienced in the last election simply as a “rulership weariness” or “decrepitude”; or partly its “degeneration”; but it will be quite missing.

If the truth that the AK Party had difficulties to hold in its hands and produce again the “social political” opening that grew and carried it to the center by the time is not focused upon, the “restoring trust” process could not be managed properly and it may cause undesirable results.

We saw that the AK Party elites examine the results and motives of the fall in June 7 election quite intensively, but with implicit consultations.

But as far as I understand from the speeches, the result that the AK Party reached after focusing on all these evaluations is; the party could not nominate the right candidates, the staff did not work enough, and a group of the AK Party voters did not vote in the elections thinking that “the party would win the election anyhow”.

In the area where the Kurdish voters live densely, the HDP's downgrading the AK Party is considered an “accidental” error.

It has been assumed that the Kurdish voters who were “mistaken” in the June elections would regain consciousness this time, especially after the terror rose again and turned into a fireball that also took the settlements inside and therefore it would be possible to compensate the losses.

Of course, this evaluation is reportedly correct. But, if it is believed that the issue is restricted with that, it means the situation is quite desperate.

Even if the election is won and there is a single rulership, the erosive effects in the deeper areas continue to work and the administrative troubles emerge in the short and middle term.

When looked at optimistically, it can be claimed that the issues with “deep sociology” and the “high ontological breaking risks” are perceived and evaluated by the AK Party elites, but are being kept away from the election speeches with some tactical concerns, assigned to the agenda of an AK Party which restored trust.

Even so, the election tactics should be adjusted more carefully. Especially on the HDP issue, the kind of a path the AK Party will follow has a critical place.

We saw that the HDP experienced a major failure to prove its political maturity. It could not purify itself from the guardianship of the outlawed PKK; therefore it frustrated a mass that voted for it. Even we criticized this with a few articles. I guess HDP's failure will return back to the party with a “loss” in the November 1 election. But most likely, this loss will appear as the low election turnout in the regions where Kurdish voters are dense.

Then let's slowly complete the portrait: We can evaluate the unwillingness of the Kurdish voters to take part in the November 1 election as the melting of the hope and the political provisions of the main stream Kurdish choice who do not want to separate from Turkey.

On one hand, there is the AK Party which lost Kurdish votes; on the other, there is the HDP which could not fulfill the political assignment it received from the Kurds.

In this sense, it means the weakening of the political option for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and the rise of a big opportunity that will feed the monism of the outlawed PKK that especially affects the young population. The presence of those who will cheer this formation among the HDP staff is absolute.

Even; it is the cunningness of the hawks from the HDP making statements implying that the HDP could boycott the election under the color of the reasonable decision on uniting the election boxes in the insecure regions.

But I don't think that the HDP's staff completely think so. Even if it is rarely heard and is not explicitly spoken, I think that there are ones who don't accept the “HDP=PKK” formula and resist against this political stance.

In this respect, I don't find the desire to evaluate and process the “closeness” between the HDP and the outlawed PKK as an “identity” and drop and dig the HDP under the threshold meaningful.

If this will occur as the Kurdish voters' support of the AK Party through the independent choices, there is no problem. But it doesn't seem to happen this way.

It is not realistic to expect the AK Party to compensate the things it lost in these regions, at least for the November 1 election.

There may be a little recovery and increase. It can only make the AK Party experience a “Pyrrhic victory”.

The election strategy of the AK Party seems to be deadlocked on one hand to develop a speech in the nationalist tone to win the votes that shifted to the MHP, and on the other hand, following a path based on “burying” the HDP seems to be tied.

This could provide rulership again to the party with an increase of roughly 3 percent of the votes. Could it be capable of this?

The AK Party faced the obstacles coming from the established order that were aiming to make the political success it had in 2002 unbearable.

It came to power; but for quite a long time it couldn't be capable. The party knew how to overcome this with the determination in April 27.

Now there is a similar situation. But this time, the legitimacy crisis cast for the AK Party finds a place in the social ground.

The trip up coming from the established order was very artificial and the party had no responsibility there. But when the trip up comes through the society, in one way or another, there is no “luxury to escape from the responsibility.”

We should be very careful and refrain from underestimating.