After a group of soldiers gathered under the umbrella of the "Free Officers Movement" and overthrew King Farouk on July 23, 1952, the country quickly moved to a system of government that could be defined as "state socialism". Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who garnered great success at home and abroad after nationalizing the Suez Canal, made the army the sole ruler of Egypt by squeezing Arab nationalism under his arm: On the one hand, many institutions and companies were confiscated with nationalization activities, on the other hand, the country's economy was managed by the army's administration. It is shaped in a way that it can easily control. Abdel Nasser and his friends saw themselves as the protector and savior of Egypt "in every way". Therefore, the military should not only be concerned with politics and defense, but also to "own" and protect the Egyptians economically. Thus, the army established a tight hegemony over all production, consumption, export, and import items in the country. But the biggest problem was the difficulties of managing the economy in an increasingly changing world and the ignorance of the soldiers at this point. As a result, corruption, waste of resources and ultimately poverty could not be prevented.

After the death of Jamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, Anwar Sadat, who succeeded him, started a large-scale liberalization program in the economic field when he decided to divert Egypt's direction from the Soviet Union to the U.S. In this process known as "Infitah" (Opening), Egypt's relations with the U.S. and the West were tightened. Western companies began competing for investment in Egypt. The military's role in the economy was still primary, but a competitive environment had emerged in the country. Still, a completely liberal economic model could not be spoken of, because the beneficiaries of Infitah were a handful of capitalist businessmen in the close circle of Anwar Sadat, and the army indirectly benefited from this channel.

When President Hosni Mubarak, who took the helm after the assassination of Anwar Sadat by a captain in his own army on October 6, 1981, had to focus on economic liberalization policies in the early 1990s - under pressure from the U.S. and the IMF - the army managed to protect its privileges. Military dominance continued in all critical sectors of the country, tax exemptions continued in the investments of the army, and all related expenditures were kept under "state secrets".

In the past 10 years, the role of the Egyptian army in the country has reached its most dominant and intense proportions in recent history. With many critical decisions signed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi, himself a former general from the ranks of the army, the military's weight in politics, media, foreign policy, and, of course, the economy, in addition to defense, has reached unprecedented levels. From pasta to cement, from tourism to drinking water, Egypt's "state secret" headings in the budget of the army, which appeared in every production and consumption item, increased.

But… Along with all these developments, the fact that Egypt was dragged into the deepest economic crisis in its recent history, its currency was devalued three times in the last year, poverty and even hunger began to push the limits of the people's tolerance, serious discussions about the way the army managed the economy. seems to bring it along.

In this context, one of the conditions of the loan agreement signed between the IMF and the Egyptian government in the past months was "reducing the role of the army in the economy and making arrangements to allow free competition". Considering the balance within the country, the fact that Egypt had to agree to such a condition is enough to show the extent of the bottleneck in its economy. However, the main question is: Will the Sisi administration be able to keep its promise to the IMF and save the economy from the army's clutches?

To be realistic, such a radical change is only possible with a complete reorganization of the Egyptian state structure, a "modernization" of the army-people relations, and a profound transformation in mentality. The military will resist such a process. Because, in Egypt, which has the world's 14th largest army in terms of power and number of members, the multidimensional, organic, and benefit-oriented ties established between the masses of the people and the army constitute an important obstacle to the military's withdrawal from the economy. This delicate point is also the answer to why a "civilian" democracy was so short-lived in Egypt.