They say that if a “coalition” comes out of the elections, it will be faster to progress in the economy!...
Are they mocking this glorious nation's memory?...
We all know that the coalitions formed in our country between 1960 and 2002 had been affecting many areas of activity that concerns, particularly the employment and industry sectors, and reel economy directly.
Even the great brilliance and splendid determination of the deceased Erbakan Hodja, couldn't exceed the “chump” spirit of the coalition.
After the Erbakan government (also called the Refahyol government) was overthrown by the coup d'etat, the deceased Erbakan always complained about how the nation didn't give him the opportunity to become a single rulership…
The coalition trouble!...
Look, Mr. Devlet Bahçeli is also stating that he wants to become a “single rulership”.
If a “coalition” was a good thing, would he want to become a “single rulership”?...
As the number of parties in the coalition increases, the size of the trouble expands accordingly.
The expansion under the coalition was 1.2% during the 1999 – 2002 period and 2.7% during the 1991 – 1994 period.
Inflation also entered our lives during the multi-party coalition period between 1971 and 1980; while being on the rise during the coalition periods, the inflation gradually declined during the single party periods.
What's more; it's remarking to see that the coalition governments were in charge during the years the U.S. Dollar exchange rate was devalued. As a matter of fact, during these devaluations in 1978, 1994 and 2001, the Turkish Lira (TL) severely lost in value and the nation became poor overnight.
From the point of our economy, the coalition periods in our country have gone down in history as extremely bad, uncertain and unstable years. For example, between 1991 and 2002 there had been 9 governments established and the lifespan of those governments had been 1.2 years on average. Moreover, 5 governments with less than a 1-year lifespan were formed in the same period.
The high inflation, which was revealed following the deepening political gap environment in that period, made the economy, which became vulnerable to the external debt, fiscal and current deficit, and external/internal shocks, even more vulnerable. In that process, no intervention had been done to the fragile structure, which deepened as the public deficits increased and the presumed banking reforms were not actualized, due to the political weaknesses of the coalition governments, and thus, our country experienced one of the gravest crises in its history; the 2000-2001 crisis. After the crises, we knocked on the doors of international institutions like IMF and World Bank, and that period's coalition governments borrowed the highest amount of debts in our history.
We can say that the coalition governments, which are successfully conducted in Western countries, generally result in an economic crisis in our country. The sociological reason behind this is the fact that we are a country far from the reconciliation culture. As a matter of fact, the political structure in the communities with weak reconciliation culture are affected negatively from this situation.
For example, it's not possible to make decisions necessary to increase the economic performance swiftly and implement them during coalition government periods. In such situations, economy becomes resistless against internal and external shocks, and thus, the crises can cause deeper affects. After all, the economic crises that were revealed during the last two coalition periods, presented the economic performances of coalition governments and shown us how important single party government is from the point of the forthcoming process.
As of a result; on one hand there are economic crises and poverty that are revealed due to the failures of coalition governments; on the other hand there are developments brought forwards by political and economic stability environment. When we approach the matter from this angle, we can see that the Strong Turkey is the target of the coalition scenario.
