The pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) pushed the election threshold with the boost that it received from the upscale Cihangir-Nişantaşı jet set in the June 7 elections, but it was obvious that this boost alone would not bring it above the threshold. It was quite obvious that the actual grand steam came from the wave of terror that the PKK imposed on Turkey's southeast, and the pressure it put on people there. This usurpation of space by the PKK, which was received with patience for the sake of the resolution process, made people feel abandoned by the state to a great extent. A remarkable part of the votes that went to the HDP expressed a punishing reaction to this sense of desolation.

Without a doubt, the PKK and KCK units, which explicitly and effectively carried out the election campaign everywhere, utilized distinctive methods. These methods included all types of threats, pressure, abduction, racketeering, and hijacking.

Those who expected the HDP to end the conflict and go beyond the PKK either did not sufficiently realize this relation, or even though they knew it, they were optimistic that the PKK would be by-passed as an armed force. Because the elections would provide the democratic-political representation, theoretically it was not fully a vain hope to expect them to automatically by-pass weapons. However, the question about why the PKK would give up its tutelage and power over the HDP –after it burdened it with so much debt- does not have a response of such optimism.

Meanwhile, let me remind you that the liberal leftists of upscale Cihangir-Nişantaşı neighborhoods in Istanbul –who were in a race to give advice to the PKK even at the beginning of the resolution process - did not encourage them to speed up the disarmament process of the PKK. On the contrary, they openly inculcated the PKK for not consenting to lay down their arms easily, by whispering the delusion that they did not have any remarkable acquisitions.

Now, how can we expect the same circles to consider the representative power obtained by the HDP as an acquisition, and advise the same thing to the PKK?

This is why the PKK not laying down their arms and having sanction power over Turkey through terrorism was not against the predictions of the circles that supported the HDP during the elections.

Strictly speaking, the PKK did not want to leave the joy of victory, the gains and the representative powers that would arise from this to the HDP –which is composed of different dispositions- and its deputies. Now everyone asks what the PKK wants by sabotaging the resolution process like this, but no rational evaluation brings us to a conclusion that favors the PKK.

In fact, what is more visible is nothing but the conceit of power and arrogance of the PKK administration at Qandil Mountain. It was on July 11 that Cemil Bayık had said he will perceive the government's attempts to construct roads and dams as a threat against themselves, considering it as a justification to end the resolution process. Since that day, their attacks against construction machines at dam and road constructions have soared. These conditions completely take away the votes of the Kurds, and the ability of the HDP –which collected the votes with the promise of providing a better life for the Kurds- to represent the Kurds. Because before everything, in conclusion these terrorist activities deteriorate the living conditions of the Kurds by destroying the scope of business activities. The representation ability –left from the PKK- of the deputies who were elected from the HDP are thus completely destroyed by the PKK again. In that case, the HDP's ability to demonstrate itself and pave a political course depends on expressing a stance that proves its existence against the PKK. Everyone asks whether the HDP has the courage to demonstrate such courage, and in reality, each move that the HDP is subjected to by the PKK presents an opportunity, but who has the intention to utilize these opportunities?

Before everything, it is not realistic to expect such a move from the HDP, because it generally owes its existence to the PKK –not just in the elections-. The co-chair of the party, Selahattin Demirtaş, was able to exhibit the mission to not make Erdoğan “President” with tremendous courage, but his courage was not his own. The mission he undertook does not give him the courage or maturity to oppose the PKK.

On the other hand, the PKK which does not hesitate to show itself whenever the opportunity comes seems to be very fond of this role. Following the elections, comments regarding the coalition talks came from the Qandil Mountains, one after the other. They acted as if it was not Demirtaş and 79 deputies who were elected, but themselves. Meanwhile, they also showed that they will not lay down their arms. It was obvious that the psychology behind these actions was based on election results, but a more crucial part of them stemmed from the thinking that they had guaranteed the support of the coalition forces –the U.S.- in Syria. Their calculation was not even about the hope to be discharged from being a terrorist, but was more about becoming a hero of the U.S., guaranteeing immunity.

In fact, this calculation was wrong from the top to the bottom. Terrorists who fight terrorists are still terrorists. The fight against ISIL does not justify the terrorism conducted against the Kurdish people, neither does it suffice to camouflage it. The violence against the most natural right to life, property, reason, generation, religion, roads, dams, civil life, and the freedom to choose, are not different –in terms of the characteristics-. Even though they falsely accuse Turkey of supporting ISIL, the connection of this with the accusations is about this. Turkey clearly demonstrated that it does not distinguish between terrorists and launched a front –simultaneously- against ISIL and PKK, which was an act whose rightfulness cannot be debated by anyone. Those who were caught red-handed supporting the terrorists should think about the rest.