In an exclusive interview with Yeni Şafak daily, experts from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a prominent think tank in the field of security politics, assessed the possible aftermath of the U.S. employing the weapon of sanctions against allied countries through The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and the risks facing Turkey’s defense industry, which has grown exponentially over the past twenty years.
The U.S. passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, CAATSA, in August 2017, which imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
Following protracted efforts to purchase an air defense system from the U.S. with no success, Ankara decided in 2017 to purchase Russia’s system.
American officials advised Turkey to buy the U.S. Patriot missile system rather than the S-400 system from Moscow, arguing it would be incompatible with NATO systems and expose the F-35 to possible Russian subterfuge.
Turkey, however, has emphasized that the S-400 would not be integrated into NATO operability and would therefore not pose a threat to the alliance.
SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure (AMEX) Program expert Alexandra Kuimova noted that over the last decade, economic sanctions have become an important tool in the framework of the US broader economic and foreign policy.
“Signed into law in August 2017, the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is seen as an instrument to confront Russia by threatening to cease the supply of US military equipment or components to countries that buy weapons from Russia. Supporting and strengthening existing US sanctions against Russia, CAATSA gives the US Government authority to deny US exports to countries that also buy arms from Russia. Moreover, the US Government can block any involvement by US government agencies or US companies in any transaction involving Russian arms,” continued Kuimova.
Pointing that while there is a logic in CAATSA as an instrument to blunt Russian interests that run counter to US interests, Kuimova acknowledged that it is difficult to see how CAATSA can be implemented without giving rise to problems with targeted buyers of Russian weapons.
“Most buyers of Russian weapons are also important for US national interest, sometimes US ‘strategic allies’ (e.g. India) or even allies within a formal alliance (e.g. several NATO states still operate Soviet equipment and buy spare parts and upgrades from Russia),” concluded Kuimova.
“Many states threatened with CAATSA sanctions will feel they are becoming the victim of US national interests that harm their own national interests, including interests to develop indigenous arms industries based on Russian offers of cooperation and technology transfers,” stressed Kuimova, noting that “at best that upsets their relations with the U.S., at worst it forces them away from the USA.”
Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump told Turkey: "if you activate the S-400, we'll find a way around sanctions."
Asked about the S400 - F35 tension between the U.S. and Turkey, at the end of discussions on Saturday at the sidelines of the G20 Leaders' Summit in Japan, Trump said he could not turn a blind eye to Turkey's unfair treatment by the former U.S. administration, referring to Barack Obama's reluctance to sell U.S.-made Patriot air defense systems Turkey sought to purchase in 2013.
"Obama administration said no, no, no to Turkey when they wanted to purchase Patriots and they [Turkey] bought S-400," Trump said.
Blaming the previous administration for the ongoing S400 - F35 tensions, Trump said they were the fault of “neither Turkey nor Erdoğan.”
The Turkish arms industry has grown significantly over the last two decades, Kuimova told Yeni Şafak.
“To date, Turkey has the capability to develop and produce certain types of major arms, including tanks, defense systems, military electronics. According to Turkish officials, the industry has managed to reach 65 per cent of Turkey’s defense needs through its own industry,” stated Kuimova.
Kuimova also pointed that in recent years, Turkey has been developing its military technology and capacity in the framework of a national development program the 2023 Vision.
“Turkey has stated objectives to building significant indigenous arms production capabilities to achieve some greater level of self-sufficiency in arms procurement, as well as to fulfill its ambitions to become a major arms exporter,” continued Kuimova.
Kuimova also acknowleged that while the progress of Turkish army industry is “very impressive,” the importance of equipment coming from abroad cannot be understated.
Regarding the trends in the global arms industry, Kuimova noted that “the global demand is growing but global supply seems to be growing faster'.”
According to Arms and Military Expenditure (AMEX) Program expert Siemon Wezeman, sanctions could have a very strong effect on the Turkish arms industry.
“Even if the sanctions only remain limited to the F-35s, there will still be the very real threat of further U.S. sanctions,” warned Wezeman.
Wezeman pointed that one “extreme option” for Turkey would be to “switch sides.”
“Finding partners that are not dependent on the U.S. and work with them on arms development and markets, such as Russia and China. It would, however, be a 180-degree turn for Turkey, expensive to start and slow to give results,” noted Wezeman.
Turkey is one of the larger contributors to NATO in manpower. weapons, spending and strategic position. One would think that is still important for the U.S. and for NATO. However, the rift over S-400 (and support to Kurds and policies in Syria and the Middle East) is not just between U.S. and Turkey, but resonates also wider in NATO. There is a chance that some kind of separation may come about.
However, NATO is facing since 2014 a resurgent Russia and keeps complaining about growing Russian military strength and it seems in especially now in NATO’s interest to keep a strong member like Turkey active in the alliance.
It would thus be in NATO’s interest to come to some kind of agreement on the S-400 to at least take some of the sting out of the bad relations, save face on all sides and keep the alliance intact. That could include Turkey keeping the S-400 but as a stand-alone system (not really integrated into the NATO network) and the U.S. coming with a better (lower price and more technology sharing) offer on Patriot or other U.S. advanced weapons and cooperation with Turkish industry,” concluded Wezeman.
