Frankly, looking at the game the U.S. is trying to stage in Syria together with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), this stands as a an observation result that requires testing. Questioning at this stage what the U.S. is trying to achieve by using the PYD forces it disproportionately armed under the guise of fighting Daesh may lead us to evaluate our initial post-referendum observation results differently. While arming a terrorist organization that is fighting its own NATO ally, the U.S. is ensuring this organization systematically conducts ethnic cleansing operations in the areas it opens room for them. The picture of a Raqqa liberated from Daesh is the picture of a city in ruins.
The PYD militants that the U.S. positioned in the ruins of cities like victorious heroes – as if to add insult to injury – unfurled photographs of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan across the city. In a city that has been destroyed with aerial bombings, there is no need for any ground organization. There is no liberated city; it has merely been turned into no man’s land, a wreck left behind ready to be rebuilt. It is not hard to guess what kind of vision the U.S., which nestled the PYD into this almost all-Arab city, has for the future of Syria. Isn’t the map of a terrorist corridor in northern Syria already obvious in this vision?
The question here is why is the U.S. is clearing way for the PYD, while it does not do this for Barzani in the name of the Kurds – at least in appearance? At this point, it is apparent that the U.S. attaches as much importance – as we don’t – to the difference between Barzani and the PYD. Will the U.S. or other actors incite a different attitude toward an alternative Kurdish state to Barzani in nothern Iraq that will be founded by the PYD and, in terms of its function, be a terrorist corridor, under the shadow of the so-called Kurdish state? This is a critical question that needs to be taken into account when making plans concerning the future of the region.
We eventually need to realize that the many international actors who did not provide strong support to the referendum, who initially chose to wait and see, have a problem with Barzani. It was thought that pulling the plug on Barzani, due to his stance, which was identified with Turkey until recently, would cause Turkey to lose both directly and indirectly. Perhaps the reason why some initially hesitated to take a clearer position against Barzani was the fact that this was the first time in a long time that Turkey displayed a clear stance against Barzani. It is certain that some actors which have their entire policies adjusted according to Turkey are confused about Turkey separating its paths with an ally as rapidly and as sharply. It is quite clear that they are also rubbing their hands together in Turkey’s war against its own natural ally.
What’s done is done of course, but there is great benefit in Turkey taking advantage of this situation as a major opportunity to urgently test or evaluate its own friends and foes, and their strategies in regional politics.
One other significant effect of Barzani’s failed referendum bid is that it has also damaged the division operations that are on the agenda of the Middle East’s hotspots. The division scenarios the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is making serious efforts for Iraq and Syria’s division, is trying to fuel both in Yemen and Libya, have suffered great losses with this incident. Although Israel is said to be the only one supporting the KRG’s referendum bid, it is receiving clearer and much more effective support from the UAE. As a matter of fact, the UAE is working as the actual source of the problem and toward division, not only in Iraq but in all problematic regions. Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, the leader of the Southern Movement in Yemen and the president of the Southern Transitional Council, also gave the message that the separation process would start with the effect of the first breeze of the northern Iraqi referendum. However, all that has recently happened to the KRG has entirely altered the atmosphere.
With the same impact, an attempt toward forming a new and embracing, uniting national dialogue council against Hafter, who is the reason behind the crisis in Libya and is supported by both the UAE and Egypt, that of course includes him as well, is in question.
Surely it is currently unclear how long these effects will have an impact. The goal does not always need to be separation of course. It should be known that when they are confident that they can control it as a whole, they will not want to divide it and leave a part to others –just like they want to take over control of Libya as whole through Hafter. So, does complete control in an undivided and united Iraq really belong to the Iraqis, or is the control delivered exclusively to one element alone?
Beyond the everyday promises, a strong social agreement that would observe the rights of those who have been living together for centuries needs to be stipulated. Of course, it is up to Turkey to do it.
