This review firstly outlines the current standing of the FTF phenomenon in the international arena, with reference to the United Nations Security Council's report, released in summer 2015. Secondly, the issue of FTFs from the Turkish perspective and the position of Turkey on this challenge will be examined. Within this framework, three subjects are analysed: The position of Turkey in the international efforts against FTFs, the developments regarding international cooperation to limit FTF travels to Turkey and the efforts of Turkey to bolster its border security to prevent FTF travels through Turkey. Lastly, the review analyses what Turkey and the international community have done to address FTF travels through Turkey so far. This assessment highlights what needs to be done in the future toward the solution of this problem.
Essentially, there are three institutional fora for international efforts against FTFs and, by implication, against ISIS: Anti-ISIL Coalition, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee (UN CTC). Anti-ISIL Coalition takes hard power measures against ISIS. GCTF creates a platform to decide principles against the threat, as well as paving the way for international cooperation. The UN CTC aims to establish internationally harmonized national regulations. It needs to be noted that the conceptualization process of the phenomenon of FTFs is an on-going process, and the international community seeks to understand the phenomenon to tackle it. Therefore, the efforts of GCTF and UN CTC encompass some theoretical attempts, such as defining and regulating international travel standards.
Theoretically, although the efforts of GCTF and UN CTC may overlap, these two organisations act in different ways. GCTF does not act as an international organisation and that allows eliminating red tape to some extent, for one. Moreover, the UN CTC has been acting beyond a typical international organisation. GCTF and UN CTC currently form the skeleton of the international efforts.
Admittedly, ISIS has the initiative and it can easily abuse the liberal international systems, especially the travel regulations. In other words, the international efforts are only responsive to the actions of terrorist organisations, and these organisations have the upper hand in setting the terms of the debate. The effectiveness of the international efforts is another question and so far, they have not proven capable of controlling this challenge.
Currently, we have only a few reports published by the United Nations, [1] in addition to some academic assessments of the subject. Surely, the real time media releases including social media sources give us some hints to conceptualize this phenomenon. In September 2014, The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted the Resolution 2178, which defined foreign fighters, under specific circumstances, as terrorists and provided a road map for its members to deal with the phenomenon. Essentially, the UNSCR 2178 is the cornerstone to deal with the problem and has created a capacity for leading the international cooperation to become more effective. Before the resolution, the international cooperation as well as national mechanisms did not have a reference point to deal with the problem. The UNSCR 2178 has since then paved the way for the global response to the FTF challenge. Previously, even, the lack of a definition for FTFs itself was an obstacle for efforts to address this problem. We now have tangible criteria and a roadmap at the national and international levels for tackling FTFs, which used to be a huge gap for international coordination, cooperation, or even collaboration.
The UN CTC Executive Directorate released a report entitled “
" on 14 May 2015.[2] The report underlines that the FTFs are a growing threat against their states of origin, the states they transit and the states where they are active, as well as their neighbouring zones. Particularly in the long-term FTFs pose a risk for their home countries or third countries, where they decide to reside in, as they become returnees who are labeled as “alumni" in the report. UN CTC identifies 67 most affected member states and mentions the presence of up to 30,000 FTFs in the region. Previously, we had some reports, which relied on limited sources, such as interviews, Social Network Analyses, estimations or gatherings through media. With this UN report, we, for the first time, have a report relying on extensive data based on the accumulation of member states' official approvals. At this point, it needs to be pointed out that previous analyses and the UN CTC report are in accordance with each other and the direction of the international community is on the right path to conceptualize this phenomenon.
Essentially the UN CTC report identifies five urgent measures that need to be taken by member states:
1. Preventing inter-state travel of FTFs,
2. Law enforcement,
3. Countering incitement to terrorism, including through the internet,
4. Criminalization,
5 .Financing of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.
These five points provide “what needs to be done" instructions to the international community to prevent FTF travels. Therefore, we can use these five points not only to assess the current status of FTF travels but also to create a road map to prevent FTF travels.
In a nutshell, the UN CTC states that the world had been caught unprepared to prevent FTF travels. Moreover, effective international cooperation is urgently needed to overcome it. Essentially, globalization has been encouraging individuals to travel around the world. The global system, which reflected this understanding, lacks effective instruments to prevent mobility of individuals. Hence, that principle let the FTFs travel around the world easily. Now, it is high time to think about regulating the individual mobility, with an aim to drain FTFs without mitigating the freedom of travel. Admittedly, it is a big challenge and needs significant mechanisms, such as real time international cooperation, bolstering border security or automated Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) systems.
As I argued elsewhere, Turkey is highly vulnerable to the threats posed by FTFs recruited by terrorist organisations such as ISIS and other groups in Syria and Iraq.[3] In many ways, Turkey's challenges are bigger than other countries participating in the international coalition against ISIS. Most states are concerned about “alumni" FTFs, whereas Turkey's concerns encompass not only returnees but also their travels and the possibility of their residence in Turkey as they decide to leave the conflict zone. Moreover, Turkey's proximity to the region as well as around two million refugees from the conflict zone increases the potential risks for the country.
Turkey is an active member of the international coalition against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Institutionally, both at the national and international levels, Turkey has been fulfilling its responsibilities to fight against violent extremism and terrorism. The experience of Turkey in fighting against PKK terrorist organisation for more than 30 years makes it an active contributor to the efforts against terrorism around the world, such as Turkey's role in Afghanistan soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In fact, traditionally, Turkish citizens' participation in the militant Salafi movements, particularly al-Qaida, was limited, especially considering that 98 percent of the population in Turkey is Muslim. Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (
) has been an important mechanism to prevent extremism in the country. Nevertheless, as stated in the UN CTC report, 1,300 Turkish FTFs have joined terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, who are either alive, dead or “alumni." It is a significant increase in the number of Turkish FTFs compared to previous violent extremist movements motivated by religious motives. In other words, the current FTF wave has changed the tendency in Turkey, so it has surely created a high-risk threat to Turkey.
Turkey has been performing a major humanitarian operation for refugees from Syria and Iraq. As a neighbouring country, Turkey has accepted almost two million refugees ever since the Syrian civil war began in 2011. Especially, Syrians escaping the regime's repression fled to Turkey even before terrorist activities of ISIS. Later, Syrian people fleeing from ISIS also took shelter in Turkey. In some crises, states are forced to choose whether to intervene with military means or perform humanitarian operations. If Turkey had chosen the military action in the Syrian crisis, it would have confronted serious legal and political obstacles, as well as military complications on the ground. Turkey opted for humanitarian operation and opened its borders to Syrian citizens.
The other dilemma for Turkey, which emerged after the ISIS threat to the Syrian and Iraqi people, is increasingly apparent. Getting involved in a military operation, in other words opening a ground front against ISIS, was out of question because of the difficulty of performing military and humanitarian operations simultaneously. Almost two million refugees increased vulnerabilities of Turkey for several reasons, not to mention potential infiltration of terrorist organisations. According to official statements, Turkey spent over USD 7 billion for the refugee operations. Admittedly, the scale of the operation is no less than a military one. In essence, with its humanitarian operation, Turkey focused on saving 2 million people fleeing from Assad regime and ISIS. The alternative would have been fighting against Assad regime and ISIS. The public opinion of Turkey should also be taken into account, especially the Turkish society's sensitivity toward military casualties. The loss of almost 30,000 people in 30 years, caused by PKK terrorism, still shapes public's perceptions. It is safe to assume that, the public would not tolerate more deaths caused by terrorism, including by ISIS terrorism. The Turkish public would not support ground operations against ISIS. In contrast, the Turkish public, interestingly, has not reacted openly against the USD 7 billion spent for Syrian refugees.
So far ISIS has engaged in five incidents against Turkey. Three out of five incidents were executed by returnees from the conflict zone. A typology for assessing ISIS's commitment to attacking the West, developed by Thomas Hegghammer and Peter Nesser, helps us understand the relationship between terrorist attacks and their relation with ISIS's top leadership (Table 1). In their study, Hegghammer and Nesser assess 27 cases, limited to attacks only to the West; 18 of them failed or foiled whereas the rest, nine cases, were executed. 18 out of all cases, regardless of the result, are low involvement ISIS plots. Moreover, 8 executed attacks are low involvement and only 1 attack contains high involvement of ISIS organization. The conclusion of their study shows us that ISIS does not have same level of threat to the West compared to al-Qaida in the 2000s. As a result, the nature of ISIS attacks against the West tells us that ISIS top leadership has not targeted the Western society so far.
Table 1 - The Link Typology for ISIS's Commitment to Attacking the West[4]
As for applying the typology to the attacks against Turkey (Table 2), there is not any clear evidence if the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS were commanded by the top leadership of the terrorist organisation. Nonetheless, the threat level is higher than Turkey's western allies. Three returnee FTFs on the way back to the West committed the first attack, which was of a type 3. The second one was either a sympathizer or a wife of an FTF so that we would claim it is a type 4. The other three attacks were definitely type 2 attacks. In other words, all attacks against Turkey encompass high involvement of ISIS organization according to the aforementioned typology. As a result, I would argue the threat perception to Turkey from ISIS is higher than the West, considering the high proportion of terrorist attacks in Turkey in which ISIS is involved. The last attack also needs a special attention, due to the nature of the attack. It was a direct attack against Turkish Military and Turkey immediately retaliated to them and allegedly killed the 5 attackers. Additionally, in response, Turkey raised its contribution to the anti-ISIL coalition, by opening its air bases as well as joining the air strikes.
Table 2 – Terrorist Attacks in Turkey
Hegghammer and Nesser's study shows us that there are 9 executed cases against the West, on the one hand, and on the other hand, as of September 2015, 5 terrorist attacks have been executed against Turkey. The number of cases shows that the terrorist engagements against Turkey are relatively high, compared to the Western world. As for the qualitative comparison of the cases in the West and Turkey, it shows that the involvement of ISIS leadership, according to the typology, is “high" against Turkey whereas it is “low" against the West. In essence, it is in line with its strategy; ISIS is mainly targeting the “near enemy," defining other Muslims as ISIS's primary target.
Having compared the attacks of ISIS on the West and Turkey, it is safe to argue that the FTFs and their travels create a big threat to Turkey. Having stated the threat of ISIS toTurkey, now we can turn to the Turkish position for dealing with the FTF travel problem. As stated in the introduction, this review aims to explain the status of Turkey's efforts to prevent FTF travels to and from Turkey.
As discussed earlier, the anti-ISIL coalition, GCTF and UN CTC are main pillars of the international efforts against ISIS, as well as FTFs. Turkey is a member of anti-ISIL coalition and the co-chair of GCTF. Moreover, it has actively been making contributions to these organisations. Turkey has also recently opened its air bases to anti-ISIL coalition and begun taking hard power measures against ISIS, in addition to the ongoing humanitarian operation sheltering almost two million refugees in the country. These developments have increased the vulnerability of Turkey to the possibility of terrorist attacks, currently at the highest level compared to any other member of the coalition.
Activities of Turkey in GCTF, as co-chair, have been remarkable and led to the establishment of some tangible mechanisms relying on international cooperation, such as introducing a no-entry list or programs for countering radicalism. At the same time, as a member of the United Nations, Turkey has been making contributions to UN CTC at state or society level. The report of UN CTC, released in May 2015, defined Turkey as one of the most-affected countries and released some data provided by the country.
Preventing FTFs' travel through Turkey is one of Turkey's priorities. There are two pillars of this policy: the no-entry list, based on information sharing obtained through international cooperation, either via bilateral channels or multilateral platforms; and Risk Analysis Units established at passport control points.
Turkey has regularly underlined the necessity of information sharing to establish a reliable no-entry list, the first pillar, to prevent the FTFs' entrance to Turkey. The UNSCR 2178 has paved the way to accelerate work toward improving the no-entry list, although it is far behind the critical level to achieve its objectives. Our previous brief has analysed some information, covering only the data available as of February 2015. The recent updates in the statistics since then allow us to elaborate the progress in international cooperation.
While the number of people on the no-entry list was 9,915 in January 2015, it had reached almost 19,000 people in March 2015, which enables us to conclude that international cooperation has improved so far (Graph 1). Compared to the previous years, it could be safely argued that the international community's awareness has been increasing. The acceleration of international cooperation is welcome, but the graph also explains failures of the past, which explains the estimated amount, up to 30,000, of the FTFs in the conflict zone. It needs to be stated, at this point, that every FTF travel to Turkey, in addition to other neighbouring countries, is a failure of international cooperation regarding information sharing. The increase in the number of persons on the no-entry list raises the possibility of success for preventing FTF travels.
Now, we can compare the January 2015 and September 2015 figures for no-entry lists by regions (Graph 2). That allows us to compare the progress of information sharing by regions (Graph 3).[5] The significant comparison significantly shows us that The Gulf and Middle East countries have increased their information sharing in the first three quarters of 2015. Admittedly, this is an important improvement, considering these regions' potential for FTFs.
Graph 2 - NO ENTRY LIST (Distribution by Regions- from 2011)
9,915 persons (January 2015)
19,000 persons (September 2015)
Graph 3 - Comparison of NO-ENTRY LIST Statistics between January 2015 and September 2015 (percentages)
As for the Risk Analysis Units, they had interviewed 1,400 individuals and described 344 of them as inadmissible as of January 2015. In September 2015, these figures had reached 4,156 and 1,109, respectively. Therefore, the Risk Analysis Groups have been functioning to a great extent, and they are an effective mechanism and an innovative tool to address possible shortfalls of the no-entry list.
The other case to consider is of those FTF who travel from Turkey to the conflict zone. It is therefore necessary to analyse Turkey's efforts to improve security on its borders to Syria and Iraq. The prevailing discourse on the issue is that the border is porous. In any serious analysis of this issue, however, several points need to be taken into account. Historically, the Syrian border of Turkey was a subject of illegal crossings and smuggling. Moreover, the superficial demarcation of border cut tribes and towns and occurred during the first quarter of the 20th century when the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. Hence the divided families and tribes traditionally have been crossing borders, which have been hard to prevent and control because of its very nature.[6] At the same time, the necessities of the humanitarian operation of Turkey, hosting almost 2 million refugees, resulted in Turkey not sealing its borders completely.
The Turkish Armed Forces,, which are entrusted with the responsibility to protect the land borders of Turkey by a law (Number 3497) released detailed data, in July 2015, regarding their measures to increase control along the Syrian border of Turkey.[7] In fact, the data does not necessarily mean that illegal border crosses are prevented altogether. However, it helps us analyse the extent of Turkey's efforts to prevent FTF travels through the country. Turkish Land Forces has deployed its troops and utilized most of its Unmanned Aerial Systems/Unmanned Reconnaissance Planes along the Syrian border. In addition to them, as a physical security measure the Turkish Army has constructed ditches spanning 363 km, 90 km of barbed wire, 68 km of soil block, 7 km wall, illuminated 270 km of roads and renewed 1210 km roads along the Syria border. According to the data, the efforts of Turkey as well as incidents at the borders, have been increasing since the beginning of the civil war in Syria (Table 3).
Table 3 –Incidents in Turkey-Syria Border by Years
Higher number of border incidents suggests more individuals crossing over. As Turkish authorities have been constructing ditches, barbed wires, soil blocks, lightings and road to forge the porous borders, the number of individuals who attempt to cross border illegally has been increasing. Consequently, there is an increase in the number of individuals who have been caught over the years (Graph 4). As of July 2015, the total amount of individuals caught has reached 175,120 since 2011, which is equal to 10 per cent of refugees. Not all these people are FTFs, since many of them may be ordinary refugees, smugglers or others trying to cross borders. Nonetheless, these numbers tell us something about the FTF phenomenon. From an optimistic perspective, every captured individual is another brick laid to prevent potential FTF travels. From a pessimistic perspective, it suggests more individuals, potentially some of them FTFs, attempt to cross border illegally. In other words, by and large, border crossings necessitate more efforts to prevent them.
On the issue of FTF travels, Turkey is largely an end-user of this network and, surely, every failure at prevention of travels is yet another threat to Turkey's security. Turkey perceives high threat from the FTFs, violent extremists and terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq. The FTFs are a growing threat against their states of origin, the states they transit and the states where they are active, as well as their neighbouring zones. Turkey falls under all these categories. As of September 2015, as a result of five terrorist engagements by ISIS against Turkey, 41 people are killed and more than 510 people were wounded. These casualties show the level of threat perception of Turkey.
It is obvious that the UNSCR 2178 defined FTFs of ISIS, al-Nusra and similar terrorist organizations as illegal and authorized all measures against them. However, there are other “foreign fighters" who go to the other organizations in Syria and Iraq to fight against ISIS, al-Nusra and other terrorist organizations.[8] Undoubtedly, these fighters create confusion for security agencies and they create another shortfall in the international system against FTF travels.
As for the FTF travels, Turkey has been trying to tackle it in two dimensions:
Turkey from countries of origin and
Turkey into conflict zones. The mechanisms for preventing FTF travels to Turkey, i.e., the no-entry list and Risk Analysis Groups, mostly rely on international cooperation, namely information sharing. Recent data suggest that international cooperation has been improving, though it is hardly sufficient to achieve the international community's expectations as stated in Resolution 2178.
[1] For all UN CTC reports on FTFs: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/
[2] For the full text of the report: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1514129_EN.pdf
[3] Haldun Yalçınkaya, “International Cooperation Against Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The Experience of Turkey,"
, February 2015, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2015219_policybrief22ing.pdf
[4] Thomas Hegghammer and Peter Nesser, “Assessing Islamic State's Commitment to Attacking the West,"
Vol.9, Issue 4, August 2015, pp.14-30.
[5] Interview with Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2015.
[6] Murat Yeşiltaş, “İç Savaşa Komşu Olmak: Türkiye'nin Suriye Sınır Güvenliği Siyaseti,"
, No. 136, August 2015. http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150827110513_sinir-guvenligi.pdf
[7] “Suriye Sınırında Tedbirler Artırıldı,"
, 22 July 2015, http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/suriye-sinirinda-tedbirler-arttirildi/23734
[8] Adam Rawnsley, “Meet the Americans Flocking to Iraq and Syria to Fight the Islamic State,"
, 26 August 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/26/meet-the-americans-flocking-to-iraq-and-syria-to-fight-the-islamic-state/
, Coordinator for Security Studies program at ORSAM
Associate Professor in International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology
